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Negative Lawmaking Delegations:
Constitutional Structure and Delegations to
the Executive of Discretionary Authority to
Amend, Waive, and Cancel Statutory Text
by R. CRAIG KITCHEN*
When, if ever, may the Executive amend statutory text? Suppose
the President thinks that unintended consequences of a
comprehensive statutory scheme fall disproportionately on certain
groups. May the President waive the legal force or effect of the
offending statutory provisions for those groups? Can the Executive
unilaterally repeal part of a statute by cancelling the legal force or
effect of its text? Over a decade ago, in Clinton v. City of New York,
the Supreme Court suggested that the answer to all three questions is
"no." Congress may not give the Executive the unilateral power to
change the text of duly enacted statutes because amendment and
repeal of statutes, no less than enactment, must conform with
bicameralism and presentment. In so holding, the Court purported to
enforce the requirements of Article I, Section 7, thereby honoring the
constitutional text and structure governing lawmaking. This Article
reexamines the Court's holding and shows that it has had limited, if
any, impact on judicial review of lawmaking delegations.
Relying in part on the Court's analysis, this Article then proposes
an analytical framework for lawmaking delegations. The framework,
based on the effect the delegated power has on statutory text,
categorizes lawmaking delegations as either positive or negative.
Positive lawmaking delegations involve the Executive's delegated
* Law Clerk, Hon. Paul J. Watford, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. Harvard Law School, J.D., 2012; George Mason University, B.A., 2006. 1 am
grateful to John F. Manning for his wise counsel and guidance in developing this Article. I
thank Rich Chen, Katherine R. Gasztonyi, and Jonathon Roth for comments on earlier
drafts. I also thank Ward Farnsworth for his encouragement, and Judge Brett Kavanaugh
for helpful conversations during his separation of powers class at Harvard, which sparked
the idea for this Article. This Article is dedicated to the memory of my sister Monica
Leigh Kitchen, whose lively banter I sorely miss.
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power to create rules or standards that are binding with the force of
law. Negative lawmaking delegations involve the Executive's
delegated power to negate the legal force or effect of statutory text.
Within the statutory landscape of the modern administrative state,
four distinct types of negative lawmaking delegations predominate:
(1) contingent legislation, which predicates the negative power on the
Executive's finding of a condition or fact; (2) amendment, which
allows the Executive to modify the legal force or effect of statutory
text; (3) waiver, which grants the Executive the power to negate the
legal force or effect of statutory text for specific persons, projects, or
categories of activities; and (4) cancellation, which allows the
Executive to rescind the legal force or effect of statutory text entirely.
Formally, each type of negative lawmaking delegation allows the
partial or total negation of statutory text and is thus constitutionally
suspect under the Court's formulation of Article I, Section 7's
requirements. Beyond formal negative effect, however, negative
lawmaking delegations also share a significant functional pathology in
light of the constitutional structure: they allow the Executive to undo
the legislative compromises necessary to specify the details of
statutory text. Understood in this way, many, if not most, negative
lawmaking delegations are unconstitutional because they undermine
a key structural purpose of Article I, Section 7-namely, protecting
political minorities by empowering them to demand accommodation
in determining the details of the laws that govern them. Moreover,
reinvigorating Article I, Section 7 as a constraint on negative
lawmaking delegations would protect the fruits of hard-fought
legislative battles, thereby respecting compromise, rather than
undermining it.
Introduction
During his unsuccessful presidential bid in 2012, former
Massachusetts governor Mitt Romney promised that, if elected, he
would seek full legislative repeal of the Affordable Care Act
("ACA"), President Obama's signature legislative achievement.
Governor Romney, perhaps recognizing that full Republican control
of Congress was unlikely, also made an alternative promise-in
essence, to functionally repeal much of the ACA, at least for the
states, by unilaterally exempting them from many of the Act's
526 [Vol. 40:3
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requirements.' Although Governor Romney lost the presidential
election, his campaign promise nevertheless presents a fascinating
and recurring separation of powers question: When, if ever, may the
Executive unilaterally change, cancel, or otherwise negate the legal
force or effect of statutory text? Under current separation of powers
doctrine, the correct answer would seem to be "never." The Supreme
Court has made clear that "amendment and repeal of statutes, no less
than enactment, must conform with" bicameralism and presentment,2
a rule it reaffirmed when it held that it is unconstitutional to give the
President "the unilateral power to change the text of duly enacted
statutes."
As with many areas of separation of powers doctrine, however,
what seems like a clear rule in theory is in application anything but.
Consider Governor Romney's campaign pledge. To accomplish his
goal, he planned to use a waiver delegation in the ACA, a type of
delegated executive lawmaking power that, in this case, authorizes
the Secretary of Health and Human Services to waive for a given
state many of the Act's health insurance requirements. By ordering
the Secretary to grant a waiver to every state, Governor Romney
could override the details of the ACA's health insurance
requirements, thereby accomplishing via executive fiat what he was
unlikely to be able to do via bicameralism and presentment.4
Despite the Supreme Court's pronouncements to the contrary,
many types of lawmaking delegations in the administrative state allow
the Executive to change the text of duly enacted statutes, all without
bicameralism and presentment. Indeed, Governor Romney's
campaign promise reflects only one such delegation in the ACA; the
1. Mitt Romney, If I Were President: Obamacare, One Year In, NAT'L REV. ONLINE
(Mar. 22, 2011, 8:20 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/262800/if-i-were-
president-obamacare-one-year-mitt-romney (promising to issue "an executive order
paving the way for Obamacare waivers to all 50 states" if elected President). The
executive order would seek to "return the maximum possible authority to the states to
innovate and design health-care solutions that work best for them." Id. The waiver to
which Governor Romney referred is known as a "Waiver for State Innovation." Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1332(a)(1), 124 Stat. 119, 203
(2010). For more on its substantive and procedural requirements, see infra notes. 81-83
and accompanying text.
2. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954 (1983).
3. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417,447 (1998).
4. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (detailing the requisite procedures for making "Law":
passage by both Houses and signature by the President after presentment, passage by a
supermajority of both Houses if the President returns the bill unsigned, or the expiration
of ten days (excluding Sundays) after presentment without signature or return by the
President, unless Congress adjourns beforehand).
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sections on Medicare contain others. Section 3022 creates a shared-
savings program for affordable care organizations, sets out elaborate
requirements the program must meet, and then allows the Secretary
to waive those requirements, as well as any other requirements of the
Medicare statute and certain provisions of the Social Security Act
("SSA") "as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this
section."' Section 3023, on payment bundling, likewise provides
detailed requirements over several pages of the United States
Statutes at Large; it then similarly allows the Secretary to waive any
provision of the Medicare statute, as well as portions of the SSA
governing peer review, fraud and abuse, and administrative
simplification. And section 3403, which establishes the Independent
Payment Advisory Board ("IPAB"), requires that Health and Human
Services ("HHS") implement the Board's proposed changes to
Medicare provider payments to meet cost-control targets, unless
Congress enacts a statute that meets the same targets.! Though
Congress has long "micromanaged Medicare provider payments" and
failed to enact legislation meaningfully reducing such payments,
section 3403 allows the IPAB to do what Congress has thus far been
unable or unwilling to do-that is, change the law governing
Medicare provider payments to cut costs substantially.
Moreover, the ACA is not unique in its delegation of a unilateral
power to negate the legal force or effect of statutory text. In foreign
affairs,9 national security," environmental law," immigration," trade,"
5. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, ("ACA") Pub. L. No. 111-148, §
3022, 124 Stat. 119, 395-99 (2010).
6. Id., § 3023, 124 Stat. at 399-403.
7. Id. § 3403, 124 Stat. at 489-507.
8. Timothy Stolzfus Jost, The Real Constitutional Problem with the Affordable Care
Act, 36 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 501, 503-06 (2011).
9. See, e.g., Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-11, § 1503, 117 Stat. 559, 579 (2003) (giving the President the
authority to "suspend the application of any provision of the Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990"
as well as to "make inapplicable with respect to Iraq section 620A of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 or any other provision of law that applies to countries that have
supported terrorism"); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-181, § 1083(d), 122 Stat. 3, 343-44 (2008) (authorizing the President to waive "any
provision of this section with respect to Iraq" upon making certain findings and notifying
Congress within 30 days).
10. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9620(j)(1) (2006) (authorizing the President to issue orders
exempting specific Department of Energy and Department of Defense sites or facilities
from certain environmental law requirements in the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA") and the Superfund
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other healthcare statutes,14 and so forth, Congress often delegates to
the Executive discretionary authority to waive, cancel, and sometimes
even amend text that has been enacted as "Law."" Accordingly,
Governor Romney's campaign promise, though audacious in scope, is
not the only recent example of reliance on statutory waivers as a
means to achieve policy ends outside the bicameral legislative
process. The Obama Administration, for example, has used (on over
a thousand occasions) a different kind of ACA waiver, thereby
exempting many entities from one of the Act's requirements." Doing
Amendments when exemption is "necessary to protect the national security interests of
the United States at that site or facility").
11. See, e.g., International Dolphin Conservation Program Act, Pub. L. No. 105-42,
§ 303(a)(2)(C), 111 Stat. 1122, 1132 (1997) (authorizing the Secretary of Commerce to
"make such adjustments as may be appropriate" to certain statutory provisions in a statute
enacted to protect dolphins from the dangers of industrial tuna fishing).
12. See, e.g., REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 102(c), 119 Stat. 231, 302
(2005) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary of Homeland Security
shall have the authority to waive all legal requirements such Secretary, in such Secretary's
sole discretion, determines necessary to ensure expeditious construction of the barriers
and roads under this section.").
13. See, e.g., Act of Oct. 1, 1890, 26 Stat. 567 (1890) (upon a finding of "reciprocally
unequal and unreasonable" tariff duties being imposed by Great Britain, directing the
President to "suspend, by proclamation to that effect, the provisions of this act relating to
the free introduction of [certain listed goods]. . . for such time as he shall deem just").
14. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2006) (granting the Secretary of Health and Human
Services the power to "waive compliance with any of the requirements of [various
sections] of this title, as the case may be, to the extent and for the period he finds
necessary to enable such State or States to carry out [any experimental, pilot, or
demonstration project likely to assist in promoting the objectives of the statute]").
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
16. The Obama Administration's issuance of waivers may not be authorized by any
express delegation of waiver authority in the ACA itself. See Philip Hamburger, Health-
Care Waivers and the Courts, NAT'L REV. ONLINE (Mar. 14, 2011, 5:00 AM),
http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/261982/health-care-waivers-and-courts-philip-
hamburger. Consequently, the Obama Administration has justified the waivers as follows:
"the law and regulations issued on annual limits allow [HHS] to grant temporary waivers
from this one provision of the law that phases out annual limits if compliance would result
in a significant decrease in access to benefits or a significant increase in premiums."
Annual Limits, CENTER FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, CENTERS FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVICES, http://cciio.cms.gov/programs/marketreforms/annuallimit/index.html (last
visited Mar. 17, 2012) (emphasis added).
17. See Sam Baker, HHS Grants 106 New Healthcare Waivers, HEALTHWATCH, THE
HILL (Aug. 19, 2011, 4:33 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatchlhealth-reform-
implementation/177581-hhs-grants-106-new-healthcare-waivers. Some healthcare plans,
many of which cover low-income workers, limit the amount they pay out in any given year;
the ACA gradually bans this practice and requires greater coverage. Waivers have been
granted to those companies that might stop offering healthcare coverage altogether rather
than offer the greater coverage required under the Act. See Annual Limits, supra note 16.
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so has allowed the Obama Administration to ameliorate what it
deemed an unacceptable regulatory burden caused by the ACA, all
without the need to seek statutory amendment from what likely
would have been a recalcitrant Congress.
Are these types of lawmaking delegations to the Executive-
ones allowing unilateral override of statutory text-different from the
now ubiquitous delegations to the Executive of positive lawmaking
power? Is there something inviolable about statutory text, something
that makes its cancellation through delegated lawmaking processes
problematic for the separation of powers? This Article
comprehensively analyzes these questions in light of the
constitutional text and structure governing lawmaking" and law
execution.'9  In so doing, this Article proposes an analytical
framework for lawmaking delegations based on the effect that
delegated lawmaking power has on statutory text. Broadly speaking,
lawmaking delegations are either positive or negative. Positive
lawmaking delegations-for example, administrative rulemaking-
allow the Executive to exercise discretion to create rules or standards
that are binding with the force of law. Negative lawmaking
delegations, in contrast, allow the Executive to exercise discretion to
negate, in whole or in part, the legal force or effect of statutory text.
Surveying the statutory landscape of the modern administrative
state shows that four distinct types of negative lawmaking delegations
predominate: (1) contingent legislation, which predicates the negative
power on the Executive's finding the existence of a condition or fact;
(2) amendment, which delegates to the Executive the authority to
modify the legal force or effect of statutory text; (3) waiver, which
grants the Executive the discretion to negate the legal force or effect
of statutory text for specific persons, projects, or categories of
activities; and (4) cancellation, which allows the Executive to rescind
the legal force or effect of statutory text entirely.
Despite this justification for granting the waivers, some of the recipients include economic
heavyweights such as Oxford Health Insurance, the Service Employees International
Union, and PepsiCo. See Philip Hamburger, Are Health-Care Waivers Unconstitutional?,
NAT'L REV. ONLINE (Feb. 8, 2011, 4:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/
259101/are-health-care-waivers-unconstitutional-philip-hamburger.
18. "Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the
Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the United
States...." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
19. The President is to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." Id. art. II, §
3.
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Beyond classifying negative lawmaking delegations, a task never
comprehensively undertaken by commentators, this Article also sheds
new light on the Supreme Court's now fifteen-year old holding in
Clinton v. City of New York.20 There, the Supreme Court invalidated
the Line Item Veto Act ("LIVA") because it allowed the President to
change statutory text without bicameralism and presentment. That
over a decade has passed since the Clinton decision suggests the time
to reexamine its import to separation of powers law has come. The
decision, after all, has not proved to be a "hidden separation of
powers blockbuster.. . , as important to separation of powers case
law as Lopez is to the Court's federalism case law." 21 It instead seems
to have had little practical effect: Congress still regularly delegates
lawmaking authority to the Executive, and as the ACA waivers show,
such delegations can allow the President (or some executive agent) to
unilaterally change the text of duly enacted statutes by altering its
legal force or effect, much like the LIVA did. Lower courts have yet
to invoke Article I, Section 7 to strike down such lawmaking
delegations; the Supreme Court has declined to intervene; and recent
separation of powers scholarship has moved on, unflinchingly
accepting Clinton's holding (that line item vetoes are unconstitutional
because they violate Article I, Section 7) and going no further.
Nevertheless, by moving beyond Clinton's focus on the formal effect
delegated executive lawmaking power has on statutory text, this
Article unites scholarship about legislative compromise with the
Article I, Section 7 test the Court used to strike down the LIVA,
finding broad implications for separation of powers analysis of
lawmaking delegations.
Among scholars, these implications have been largely
overlooked, even though commentators weighed in extensively after
the Clinton decision, spawning a voluminous literature ranging from
critical to laudatory. They contended, for example, that the Court
reached the right result and that bicameralism and presentment was
the correct rationale;2 2 that the case was "in reality a non-delegation
doctrine case masquerading as a bicameralism and presentment
case;"23 and that the decision was a travesty, a half-baked analysis
wrought from whole cloth with "no basis in text, structure, or
20. 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
21. Steven G. Calabresi, Separation of Powers and the Rehnquist Court: The
Centrality of Clinton v. City of New York, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 77, 85 (2004).
22. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 740-53 (3d ed. 2000).
23. Calabresi, supra note 21, at 85.
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precedent."2 4  They penned lengthy articles deconstructing the
constitutional arguments on all sides, both before and after the Court
decided the case.25 And they attacked with renewed vigor the puzzle
of reconciling nondelegation doctrine with the rise of the
administrative state.2 6
Although more recent separation of powers scholarship seems to
have disregarded Clinton, recognizing the decision's promised
revolution never came, a proper understanding of the decision
suggests it may have been given short shrift. Rather than discard
Clinton as a formalist anachronism,27 separation of powers scholarship
should view it as the Court's attempt to protect the lawmaking
process of Article I, Section 7, thereby safeguarding the compromises
that process is designed to foster. Because encouraging such
compromises-and the inherent friction of reaching compromises
24. Michael B. Rappaport, The Selective Nondelegation Doctrine and the Line Item
Veto: A New Approach to the Nondelegation Doctrine and Its Implications for Clinton v.
City of New York, 76 TUL. L. REV. 265, 269 (2001) (arguing that Clinton's Article I,
Section 7 analysis was a "feeble substitute... suggest[ing] that the Court is simply
unwilling to hold laws unconstitutional under the nondelegation doctrine").
25. See, e.g.. Lawrence Lessig, Lessons from a Line Item Veto Law, 47 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 1659, 1660-63 (1997) (arguing that the Act delegated too much discretion to the
Executive to strike specific policy choices made by Congress, and predicting that the Court
would therefore strike it down under nondelegation doctrine); Elizabeth Garrett,
Accountability and Restraint: The Federal Budget Process and the Line Item Veto Act, 20
CARDOZO L. REV. 871, 872 (1999) (arguing that the LIVA was really about delegation,
that the Court thus erred in applying the formalistic reasoning of Chadha, and that the
proper analysis would have instead used nondelegation doctrine); Leslie M. Kelleher,
Separation of Powers and Delegations of Authority to Cancel Statutes in the Line Item Veto
Act and the Rules Enabling Act, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 395, 397 (2000) (arguing that the
decision was rightly decided, but that the rationale was flawed because of its "wooden
reliance on the Presentment Clause and on the formalistic reasoning of INS v. Chadha");
H. Jefferson Powell & Jed Rubenfeld, Laying It on the Line: A Dialogue on Line Item
Vetoes and Separation of Powers, 47 DUKE L.J. 1171, 1172 (1998) (discussing how many
thought the Act violated the requirements of bicameralism and presentment); Saikrishna
B. Prakash, Deviant Executive Lawmaking, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1998);
Michael B. Rappaport, Veto Burdens and the Line Item Veto Act, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 771,
773 (1997) (relying on the executive's veto power and the nondelegation doctrine);
Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Future of the Item Veto, 83 IOwA L. REV. 79, 104-18 (1997)
(also discussing the scholarly consensus that the Act violated the requirements of
bicameralism and presentment).
26. For a thorough discussion of the topic shortly after the Clinton decision, see
Symposium, The Phoenix Rises Again: The Nondelegation Doctrine from Constitutional
and Policy Perspectives, 20 CARDOZO L, REv. 731 (1999).
27. See Harold H. Bruff, The Incompatibility Principle, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 225, 250
(2007) (arguing that "Clinton is thus a formalist opinion much in the style of Chadha" and
that "the Court was wrong" and the two dissenting justices-Justices Scalia and Breyer-
were right).
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among two multi-member deliberative bodies (representing diverse
constituencies) and a unitary Executive (representing a national
constituency)-was a deliberate choice by the Framers (one with
numerous salutary benefits), courts should strike down lawmaking
delegations when they undermine that deliberate constitutional
choice. By doing so, courts would respect the lawmaking process
mandated by Article I, Section 7, which in turn safeguards the
political minorities for whose protection the process was designed.
Reinvigorating Article I, Section 7 as a constraint on lawmaking
delegation, moreover, would honor the historical background of the
Take Care Clause, which shows that the clause was designed to
address the problems of suspension and dispensation, problems
similar to those presented by delegating negative lawmaking power to
the Executive.
This Article begins by discussing modern doctrine governing
judicial review of lawmaking delegations. Part II introduces the
Article's analytical framework and describes the positive and negative
lawmaking delegation dichotomy in greater detail. Negative
lawmaking delegations are then further broken down into four sub-
categories. Part III surveys all federal court decisions deciding
separation of powers challenges to lawmaking delegations using the
bicameralism and presentment-based test of Clinton. The analysis
shows that Clinton has had little, if any, impact on judicial review of
lawmaking delegations, even where the challenged delegation
involved negating statutory text. Nondelegation doctrine remains a
largely theoretical constraint on the scope of discretion delegable by
Congress to the Executive, while Article I, Section 7 remains
essentially no constraint at all.
Part IV analyzes negative lawmaking delegations given the
constitutional text, structure, and history animating separation of
powers doctrine. The analysis demonstrates that negative lawmaking
delegations are constitutionally suspect in light of the historical
backdrop of the Take Care Clause and the purposes served by the
Article I, Section 7 lawmaking process. Part V draws upon these
insights and contends that, whatever the overall state of modern
nondelegation doctrine, negative lawmaking delegations are more
problematic than positive ones because they allow the override of
specific legislative compromises, often undermining legislative success
achieved by political minorities. This consequence allows negative
lawmaking delegations to weaken a key protective feature of the
constitutional structure, a result demonstrated by examining recent
examples of the use of negative lawmaking delegations. Although
NEGATIVE LAWMAKING DELEGATIONS 533
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this examination demonstrates that each of the four types of negative
lawmaking delegations formally allows the Executive to negate
statutory text (thus raising concerns under the Court's holding that
altering statutory text requires bicameralism and presentment),
amendment, waiver, and cancellation are the most problematic.
Contingent legislation is less so, because it has a firmer place in our
historical tradition, and because it is less likely to undermine the
minority-protective function of the constitutional structure.
I. The Doctrine Governing Judicial Review of
Lawmaking Delegations
There are currently two analytical frameworks for determining
whether lawmaking delegations to the Executive are constitutional:
nondelegation doctrine," and a test based on bicameralism and
presentment.29 As convenient shorthand, this Article refers to the
latter test as the Article I, Section 7 test. This Part briefly reviews the
current state of nondelegation doctrine, before turning in greater
detail to the Article I, Section 7 test.
28. See Prakash, supra note 25, at 11-12. Early political philosophers, as members of
the Court have noted, supported the idea of a nondelegation principle: "'[t]he legislative
cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other hands; for it being but a delegated
power from the people, they who have it cannot pass it over to others."' Indus. Union
Dept., AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 673 n.1 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring) (quoting JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT, IN THE
TRADITION OF FREEDOM 244 at 1 141 (M. Mayer ed. 1957)). This concern with
separating powers was also noted by the Framers: "When the legislative and executive
powers are united in the same person or body ... there can be no liberty, because
apprehensions may arise lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws to
execute them in a tyrannical manner," THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 318-19 (James
Madison) (Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. ed., 2009) (quoting BARON DE
MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 151-52 (Colonial Press ed. 1900)). For a thorough
historical treatment tracing the development of the nondelegation doctrine from the early
nineteenth century to the present, see Steven F. Huefner, The Supreme Court's Avoidance
of the Nondelegation Doctrine in Clinton v. City of New York: More Than "A Dime's
Worth of Difference", 49 CATH. U. L. REv. 337, 341-59 (2000).
29. Before Chadha and Clinton, both of which struck down lawmaking delegations
based on bicameralism and presentment, nondelegation doctrine was the sole judicial tool
for determining whether a lawmaking delegation was constitutional. See INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919, 944-59 (1983); see also Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 447-49
(1998). The Court has also used nondelegation doctrine to evaluate delegations of
lawmaking authority to the Judiciary. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-72
(1989) (applying the "intelligible principle" test to a lawmaking delegation to the United
States Sentencing Commission, an independent commission in the judicial branch).
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A. Nondelegation Doctrine and the Rise of the Administrative State
Nondelegation doctrine is "the Energizer Bunny of
constitutional law: No matter how many times it gets broken, beaten,
or buried, it just keeps on going and going."" The doctrine stems
from the structural allocation of enumerated powers among three
branches." Because under our tripartite system only Congress may
exercise "legislative power,"' Congress must delegate its legislative
authority by statute before another branch may exercise legislative-
type discretion. Such a delegation, however, may not delegate
"legislative power" outside of Congress. Accordingly, lawmaking
delegations must provide an "intelligible principle"" constraining
another branch's exercise of discretion, thereby preventing delegation
of the broader "legislative power" that is constitutionally allocated to
Congress alone.
This simple but obviously circular principle has vexed courts and
commentators for decades, and a precise demarcation of the
boundary between legislative and executive power has proven
elusive, largely because statutes and administrative rules look so
alike. The exact same text may represent an exercise of either power,
30. Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 330 (2002).
31. Id. at 334 ("The nondelegation principle is grounded in the more basic principle
of enumerated powers. Executive officials generally cannot exercise legislative powers on
their own initiative because they are not granted any such power by the Constitution.").
For an excellent and comprehensive originalist treatment of the nondelegation doctrine,
see generally id.
32. See, e.g., Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 164-65 (1991) ("The Constitution
provides that '[aill legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States.' From this language the Court has derived the nondelegation doctrine: that
Congress may not constitutionally delegate its legislative power to another branch of
Government.") (citation omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1); Mistretta, 488 U.S. at
371-72 ("The Constitution provides that '[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States,' and we long have insisted that 'the integrity
and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution' mandate that
Congress generally cannot delegate its legislative power to another Branch.") (citations
omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 and Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649,692 (1892)).
33. The Court initially used this now ubiquitous language in J. W. Hampton, Jr., &
Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394,409 (1928): "If Congress shall lay down by legislative act
an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to fix such rates is directed
to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power."
Since then, the Court has repeatedly used the phrase "intelligible principle" as the test for
determining whether the nondelegation doctrine has been violated. See, e.g., Whitman v.
Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (quoting J. W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409).
34. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372 (noting that "the separation-of-powers principle, and
the nondelegation doctrine in particular, do not prevent Congress from obtaining the
assistance of its coordinate Branches" and discussing the intelligible principle







depending on whether it appears in the United States Statutes at
Large after bicameralism and presentment, or the Federal Register as
a final rule after notice and comment.'
Despite calls by some Justices to abandon nondelegation
doctrine,36 Supreme Court precedent, which presumes that each
Branch is exercising its constitutionally allocated power, still focuses
on the scope of discretion granted and the identity of the actor
exercising discretion, rather than the nature or character of the
discretion exercised." As long as the degree of discretion conferred
on the Executive falls "comfortably within the scope of discretion"
permitted by Court precedent, legislative power has not been
delegated, even when the nature of the power might otherwise seem
legislative.38
Although the nondelegation doctrine purports to constrain how
much discretion Congress may delegate, any such constraint is more
theoretical than real. The Court, which has not explicitly invalidated
any statute on nondelegation grounds 9 since 1935,40 now regularly
strains to find intelligibility in statutes that, on their face, appear
standardless. 4' Accordingly, nondelegation doctrine is virtually dead
35. Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV 61, 78-
79 (2006). Professor John F. Manning makes a similar point: "If Congress wants to adopt
a per se rule of antitrust liability for horizontal price fixing, it can of course do so if it
enacts a statute through the procedures of bicameralism and presentment. The Executive,
however, could adopt a similar per se rule pursuant to broadly worded delegations of
rulemaking power from Congress, as long as Congress has supplied an intelligible
principle." John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV.
L. REV. 1939, 2019 (2011) (footnotes omitted).
36. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 488 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring injudgment) ("The proper characterization of governmental power should generally depend
on the nature of the power, not on the identity of the person exercising it.") (citations
omitted).
37. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) ("When any Branch acts, it is
presumptively exercising the power the Constitution has delegated to it.").
38. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 472, 476 ("[Tjhe constitutional question is whether the
statute has delegated legislative power to the agency. ... [The] text [of Art. I, § 1] permits
no delegation of those powers.") (citations omitted).
39. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 318-19
(2000) (explaining that "the Court has not used the doctrine to invalidate any statute since
that time, notwithstanding many occasions when it might have found an absence of the
requisite 'intelligible principle."') (citations omitted).
40. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935);
Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
41. "The Supreme Court has resoundingly rejected every nondelegation challenge
that it has considered since 1935, including challenges to statutes that instruct agencies to
regulate based on the 'public interest, convenience, or necessity' and to set 'fair and
equitable' prices. After 1935, the Court has steadfastly maintained that Congress need
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as a matter of precedent,42 with modern decisions by the Court having
swept the doctrine to the historical ash heap. To the extent the
doctrine remains viable, it operates as a constitutional avoidance
canon," through which the Court narrowly construes statutory
delegations that otherwise appear so broad that they tread close to
the constitutional line."
B. The Article I, Section 7 Test for Negative Lawmaking
Delegations
Nondelegation doctrine's relegation to lesser status as canon of
construction, rather than structural constitutional rule with greater
bite, at times troubled the Court, but such concerns never provided
more than anecdotal fodder to criticize the doctrine." Rather than
recast nondelegation doctrine, the Court looked to the Article I
lawmaking process to fashion a new limitation on lawmaking
delegations.
only provide an 'intelligible principle' to guide decisionmaking, and it has steadfastly
found intelligible principles where less discerning readers find gibberish." Lawson, supra
note 30, at 328-29 (citations and quotations omitted).
42. The delegation of positive lawmaking power is ubiquitous in the modern era, as
Congress has recognized its inability to define with particularity rules and standards
necessary to cover all the fields in which statutes now govern. Recognition of this
difficulty in the modern administrative state drives the Court's lax application of the
nondelegation doctrine to otherwise standardless legislation. See Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) ("[Olur jurisprudence has been driven by a practical
understanding that in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and
more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate
power under broad general directives."); see also Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the
Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1241 (1994) ("[T]he Court believes-
possibly correctly-that the modern administrative state could not function if Congress
were actually required to make a significant percentage of the fundamental policy
decisions.").
43. John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000
Sup. Cr. REV. 223, 223 ("The nondelegation doctrine, in other words, now operates
exclusively through the interpretive canon requiring avoidance of serious constitutional
questions.").
44. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 373 n.7.
45. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 489 (2001) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (arguing the Court should abandon the
nondelegation doctrine and acknowledge that Congress actually does delegate legislative
power and that this practice is "fully consistent with the text of the Constitution"); id. at
487 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Although this Court since 1928 has treated the 'intelligible
principle' requirement as the only constitutional limit on congressional grants of power to
administrative agencies, the Constitution does not speak of 'intelligible principles' . .. On
a future day, however, I would be willing to address the question whether our delegation
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1. Origins: The Legislative Veto
The Court turned to the structural constitutional drawing board
in 1983 when it found unconstitutional the one-house legislative veto
in INS v. Chadha.46 The Immigration and Nationality Act of 195247
delegated to the Attorney General the authority to suspend
deportation of an alien who satisfied certain statutory criteria," but it
also allowed one house of Congress to "veto" the Attorney General's
exercise of delegated power.'
Analyzing a constitutional challenge to the House of
Representative's exercise of such a veto, the Court concluded that the
House's action was "essentially legislative in purpose and effect"
because it "alter[ed] the legal rights, duties and relations of persons,
including the Attorney General, Executive Branch officials and
Chadha, all outside the legislative branch."o The Court reasoned that
Congress, absent the one-house veto, could only have overridden a
deportation decision made by the Attorney General (whose power to
make such a decision derived from a previously enacted statute) by
enacting a new statute. Because enacting a new statute would require
bicameralism and presentment, Congress could not override the
Attorney General's delegated policy choice outside that process.
Recognizing the problems with its Article I, Section 7 analysis,
the Court tried to distinguish the unconstitutional one-house exercise
of legislative power by Congress from the Attorney General's
exercise of discretion. Its reasoning on this score, in short, was as
follows. Congress has to comport with bicameralism and
presentment, but the Attorney General's exercise of discretion does
not, even though it has the same effect on the legal rights, duties, and
relations of persons as the one-house veto. This is so because an
agent exercising delegated authority cannot exceed the power
delegated in the statute, and therefore the statute delegating
authority also serves as a constraint on that authority. In addition,
46. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,959 (1983).
47. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537) (2006)).
48. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(2) (1994) (repealed 1996).
49. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 925.
50. Id. at 952. Of course, this reasoning could easily apply to any positive or negative
lawmaking delegation, as surely administrative rules "alter[] the legal rights, duties and
relations of persons... outside the legislative branch," making them "essentially
legislative in purpose and effect."
51. Id. at 952-55.
52. Id. at 953 n.16.
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judicial review and the "power of Congress to modify or revoke the
authority entirely" serve as further checks on executive action."
Why such constraints on delegated lawmaking authority, if they
had existed, would have been insufficient in the case of the one-house
veto, the Court did not say. Nor did it say whether such constraints
would generally be sufficient to allow actions taken without
bicameralism and presentment to override the delegated policy
choice of an executive agent acting under a statutory delegation.
Nevertheless, what the Court did say laid the groundwork for the
principle that, in some instances, it is unconstitutional to allow
something less than bicameralism and presentment to negate a
lawmaking action taken under a statutorily delegated power.
2. Evolution: The Line Item Veto Act
Fifteen years later, the Court drew on Chadha's reasoning when
it evaluated a constitutional challenge to the Line Item Veto Act
("LIVA") in Clinton v. City of New York." The LIVA allowed the
President to "cancel in whole" certain spending and tax-benefit
provisions enacted into law through bicameralism and presentment."
The Act thus allowed the President to cancel duly enacted statutory
law, a delegated lawmaking power different in kind from the typical
interstitial gap filling that administrative rulemaking is thought to
entail. The President could not cancel anything before first making
three determinations, each of which seemed like an intelligible
principle. After reviewing the legislative history, purpose, and other
relevant information about the items targeted for cancellation, the
President had to determine that each cancellation would "(i) reduce
53. Id. The Court has never expressly held that judicial review is required as a check
on rulemaking by the Executive in order to ensure that it does not violate nondelegation
doctrine. Whatever the merits of enlisting the Judiciary to help police the exercise of
discretion by the Executive, some litigants have asserted that preclusion of judicial review
should render broad lawmaking delegations unconstitutional as delegations of "legislative
power" in violation of the nondelegation doctrine. See, e.g., County of El Paso v. Chertoff,
No. EP-08-CA-196-FM, 2008 WL 4372693 at *5-7 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2008) (rejecting
plaintiffs' claim that "judicial review is required in the context of the intelligible principle
analysis"). These challenges have all failed, and the Supreme Court has denied certiorari.
See County of El Paso v. Napolitano, 129 S. Ct. 2789 (Mem.) (2009); Defenders of Wildlife
v. Chertoff, 554 U.S. 918 (2008).
54. 524 U.S. 417 (1998). See Rappaport, supra note 24 (arguing that the Court is
unwilling to hold laws unconstitutional under nondelegation doctrine).
55. Line Item Veto Act ("LIVA"), Pub. L. No. 104-130, § 691(a), 110 Stat. 1200, 1200
(1996), invalidated by Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). Bicameralism
and presentment require every bill to pass both houses of Congress and then be presented
to the President before it can become law. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
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the Federal budget deficit; (ii) not impair any essential Government
functions; and (iii) not harm the national interest."" Line item
cancellations under the Act rescinded discretionary budget items and
prevented direct spending and tax-benefit provisions "from having
legal force or effect.""
Exercising his item veto authority, President Clinton cancelled
one direct spending item and one limited tax benefit, and the affected
groups sued, challenging the cancellations as unconstitutional. The
first group, the City of New York, had benefited from the direct
spending item, which resolved in the City's favor a longstanding
controversy over the amount (as much as $2.6 billion) the federal
government owed the City under the Social Security Act. The second
group, comprised of owners of certain food refiners and processors,
had received a limited tax benefit allowing deferral of gain realization
when selling a food processing or refining company to a farmers'
cooperative. President Clinton determined that the direct spending
item for New York gave it preferential treatment, setting a bad
precedent, and he determined that the limited tax benefit lacked
safeguards and failed to target its benefits to smaller cooperatives."
In evaluating the President's line item cancellations, the Court
focused both formally and functionally on the effect upon statutory
text.9 After surveying the Constitution to see whether it gave the
President the power to negate or alter the legal force or effect of
statutory text, the Court found that, though the Constitution assigns
lawmaking powers to the President, this power is not among those
assigned." In so doing, Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court broke
56. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 436 (quoting LIVA, § 691(a)(3)(A)).
57. Id. (citing LIVA, §§ 691e(4)(B)-(C)). The cancellation only took effect if the
President "transmit[ted] a special message to Congress notifying it of each cancellation
within five calendar days (excluding Sundays) after the enactment of the canceled
provision." Id. (citing LIVA, § 691(a)(3)(B)).
58. Clinton, 524 U.S. 422-25.
59. Id. at 438 ("In both legal and practical effect, the President has amended two
Acts of Congress by repealing a portion of each.").
60. Id. (surveying the text of Article I and Article II for the assignment of
lawmaking responsibilities to the President). Aside from presentment, during which the
President may sign a bill, veto it, or decline to take action, art. I, § 7, cl. 2, he also "shall
from time to time give to the Congress Information on the State of the Union, and
recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and
expedient ..... U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. Because even George Washington recognized
that the Presentment Clause meant he could either "approve all parts of a Bill, or reject it
in toto," partial rejection of a bill was inconsistent with the text of the clause. Clinton, 524
U.S. at 440 (quoting 33 WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 96 (J. Fitzpatrick ed., 1940).
The Court also relied on other historical authorities. Id. (citing W. TAFT, THE
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with precedent and did not analyze the delegation of cancellation
authority by looking for an intelligible principle. Instead, the Court
concluded that the LIVA gave the President "the unilateral power to
change the text of duly enacted statutes."" The Court rejected the
Government's contention that the cancellations at issue did not
amount to a "repeal" of the cancelled items because the items
retained a "real, legal budgetary effect." 62 Although no longer
operative for the plaintiffs, the cancelled provisions still retained
some "continuing financial effect on the Government."3 This partial
retention of legal force or effect was insufficient to save the LIVA
because "[t]he cancellation of one section of a statute may be the
functional equivalent of a partial repeal even if a portion of the
section is not canceled."6"
In reaching this conclusion, the Court had to distinguish two
lawmaking delegations that seemed to allow the alteration of
statutory text without bicameralism and presentment. The first
delegation was the supersession clause of the Rules Enabling Act,
which provides that all laws conflicting with judicial rules
subsequently promulgated by the Supreme Court shall no longer have
legal force or effect." The other delegation was in the Tariff Act of
1890, which granted the President broad discretion to suspend
statutory trade duty exemptions.6 The Court, distinguishing these
delegations from the LIVA, stated:
Congress expressly provided that laws
inconsistent with the procedural rules promulgated by
PRESIDENCY: ITS DUTIES, ITS POWERS, ITS OPPORTUNITIES AND ITS LIMITATIONS; 1 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *154).




65. The Rules Enabling Act delegates to the Supreme Court the power to "prescribe
general rules of practice of procedure and rules of evidence" in federal district courts and
courts of appeals. Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072, § 2072(a) (2006). The
supersession clause provides: "All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further
force or effect after such rules have taken effect." Id. § 2072(b). For a thorough
discussion of congressional and judicial authority to promulgate procedural rules
governing the federal courts, see generally Bernadette Bollas Genetin, Expressly
Repudiating Implied Repeals Analysis: A New Framework for Resolving Conflicts Between
Congressional Statutes and Federal Rules, 51 EMORY L.J. 677 (2002).
66. See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892). Such a delegation is known as contingent
legislation, discussed in further detail in Part II.B.I.
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this Court would automatically be repealed upon the
enactment of new rules in order to create a uniform
system of rules for Article III courts. As in the tariff
statutes, Congress itself made the decision to repeal
prior rules upon the occurrence of a particular event-
here, the promulgation of procedural rules by this
Court."
Because the LIVA "authorize[d] the President himself to effect
the repeal of laws, for his own policy reasons, without observing the
procedures set out in Article I, Section 7," it was unconstitutional."8
3. A Critique and a Principle
The Court's attempt to distinguish the Rules Enabling Act and
the tariff statutes from the LIVA is unpersuasive. Surely, if the LIVA
had instead provided that spending provisions have effect until the
President promulgates his own conflicting spending provisions, it
would have equally violated Article I, Section 7.6 But under the
Court's distinction, such a hypothetical statute would have "expressly
provided that laws inconsistent" with budgetary proposals
promulgated by the President would be "automatically repealed"
upon the President's promulgation of the conflicting provisions.
Moreover, the Court's pronouncement that "[tihere is no provision in
the Constitution that authorizes the President to enact, to amend, or
to repeal statutes" 0 belies the Court's distinction. When statutory
text is superseded by the promulgation of conflicting text by the
Court, as it would be if the Court were to replace congressionally
enacted rules with new rules promulgated by the Court itself, the
statutory text is "amended" without bicameralism and presentment.
More broadly, the Court's statement that the Constitution is
silent on whether the President may enact, amend, or repeal statutes
67. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 446 n.40 (1998). This Article focuses on delegations of
lawmaking power to the Executive; delegations to the Judiciary raise additional concerns
worthy of separate treatment. For more on the constitutionality of delegating cancellation
authority to the Supreme Court, see generally Kelleher, supra note 25 (arguing that the
supersession clause of the Rules Enabling Act does not unconstitutionally violate the
separation of powers).
68. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 445.
69. The Court's analysis distinguishing the Rules Enabling Act from the LIVA has
been used by at least one court of appeals to uphold a statute that allows an administrative
agency to modify statutory text. Further discussion can be found in Part III.B.
70. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 438.
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is, of course, true, but the statement does little analytical work when
Congress, despite the Constitution's silence on the subject, may
delegate legislative-type authority and discretion to other branches."
Nevertheless, for the LIVA, the Court found "powerful reasons for
construing constitutional silence on this profoundly important issue as
equivalent to an express prohibition."72 The underlying premise is
that, when the delegated power is one to negate law from having
"legal force or effect," that delegation violates Article I, Section 7 and
"the Framers' decision that the legislative power of the Federal
government be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and
exhaustively considered, procedure."" But when the delegated power
is one to create law-that is, future rules of general applicability-the
Court looks only for an intelligible principle, which, if found, is
sufficient to uphold the delegation no matter how vague it might be.74
This apparent contradiction led some commentators to argue
that the Court's decision to strike down the LIVA implicitly rested on
nondelegation reasoning, which could not be explicit because the
intelligible principle requirement is such a weak constraint." This
argument has merit. If positive lawmaking delegations, such as
rulemaking authority, survive nondelegation challenges with vacuous
71. Id. ("Although the Constitution expressly authorizes the President to play a role
in the process of enacting statutes, it is silent on the subject of unilateral Presidential
action that either repeals or amends parts of duly enacted statutes."). But see Lawson,
supra note 30, at 333 (arguing that the Constitution "contain[s] a discernible, textually
grounded nondelegation principle that is far removed from modern doctrine."). For an
argument that the Executive Vesting Clause combined with the constitutional structure,
purpose, and history tip the balance in favor of allowing only limited delegations, see
generally Rappaport, supra note 24. Under Rappaport's framework, the LIVA was
unconstitutional because it was an overly broad delegation. See id. An alternative view
argues that the modern administrative state has not abandoned the nondelegation
doctrine but instead has replaced it with more preferable-and more limited-
nondelegation canons. See generally Sunstein, supra note 39.
72. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 439.
73. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983); see also Clinton, 524 U.S. at 439-40
(citing Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951).
74. As Justice Scalia has observed: "What legislated standard, one must wonder, can
possibly be too vague to survive judicial scrutiny, when we have repeatedly upheld, in
various contexts, a 'public interest' standard?" Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,
416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190,
216-17 (1943); N.Y. Central Secs. Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 24-25 (1932)).
75. See Rappaport supra note 24, at 269 (arguing that the Article I, Section 7 test
was a "feeble substitute" for nondelegation doctrine). Some commentators have
suggested that the nondelegation doctrine would have been sufficient to reach the same






standards such as "public interest, convenience, or necessity"1 or
mandates to set "fair and equitable"7 7 prices, the three equally
intelligible standards in the LIVA should have been sufficient under
nondelegation doctrine. A decision to strike down the LIVA on
nondelegation grounds would thus have been analytically inconsistent
with the Court's general willingness to affirm broad positive
delegations.
Despite its flaws, Clinton stands for the principle that when a
lawmaking delegation allows the Executive to negate statutory text
without bicameralism and presentment, there is greater concern over
that delegation's constitutionality than when the delegation merely
allows the positive discretionary creation of administrative rules. The
next Part draws upon this principle to advance a new analytical
framework for lawmaking delegations.
II. A New Framework For Analyzing Lawmaking Delegations
The Article I, Section 7 test's language suggests that
bicameralism and presentment limit Congress's ability to delegate its
power to amend, repeal, or otherwise negate statutory text.
Governor Romney's promise to functionally repeal the ACA, if
carried out, would have negated the legal force or effect of the waived
statutory text, as the Obama Administration's ACA waivers have
already done. Evaluating the constitutionality of each raises the
following question: Are waiver delegations more like the LIVA, or
more like the generally constitutional delegation of rulemaking
authority to administrative agencies? Both types of delegations share
two key similarities.
The first key similarity is that the entity exercising discretion is
an executive agent. Creating a new rule of general applicability that
is binding with the force of law involves the exercise of legislative
discretion, as does cancelling such a rule, or granting a waiver that
exempts some from that otherwise generally applicable rule.
However, it is the identity of the actor exercising discretion, not the
nature of that discretion, that matters under modern separation of
78powers doctrine.
76. Nat'l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 225-26.
77. Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 104 (1946).
78. Beermann, supra note 35, at 80 n.63 ("[T]here are many situations in which the
characterization of a governmental power depends entirely on the identity of the entity
exercising the power."); see also Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951 ("When any Branch acts, it is
presumptively exercising the power the Constitution has delegated to it."). Generally,
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The second key similarity between rulemaking delegations and
the waiver power delegated in the ACA is the existence of statutory
constraints. Whereas Congress operates solely within the confines of
the Constitution, Executive Branch lawmakers must also operate
within the bounds of the statute delegating lawmaking authority.79
The existence of statutory standards enlists the aid of the Judiciary as
policymaker."
Consequently, all lawmaking delegations to the Executive
involve the exercise of discretion within the constraints of a statutory
grant of delegated lawmaking authority. Such constraints
theoretically allow for judicial review. Indeed, Governor Romney's
campaign promise to order the Secretary of Health and Human
Services to issue a waiver of the ACA's legal requirements to all fifty
states involves these features of lawmaking delegation. The waiver to
which Governor Romney referred, known as a "Waiver for State
Innovation," allows the Secretary to waive many of the ACA's legal
requirements "with respect to health insurance coverage within that
State."8 1  It also requires thorough administrative procedures82 and
that states meet detailed substantive criteria before a waiver can be
granted. 3
Much like delegations of administrative rulemaking authority,
the ACA waiver provision delegates lawmaking power to an agent in
the Executive Branch-the Secretary of Health and Human
when the Court analyzes delegations of positive lawmaking power to the Executive, it
focuses on whether Congress has impermissibly delegated legislative power, which is
vested exclusively in Congress under the Constitution. See supra Part I.A.
79. Beermann, supra note 35, at 80 n.63; see also Chadha, 462 U.S. at 953 n.16.
80. See, e.g., Patrick M. Garry, The Unannounced Revolution: How the Court Has
Indirectly Effected A Shift in the Separation of Powers, 57 ALA. L. REv. 689, 693 (2006)
("The expansion of the administrative state has brought about, albeit somewhat indirectly,
a greater judicial role in the policymaking process that was originally intended to be the
province of Congress.").
81. ACA, § 1332(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 203.
82. ACA, § 1332(a)(4) (requiring, among other things, public notice and comment,
including public hearings; a detailed application; and development of a process for
thorough reporting, monitoring, and evaluation). The ACA requires the Secretary of
Health and Human Services and the Secretary of the Treasury to issue regulations
regarding the procedures for obtaining Waivers for State Innovation under section 1332 of
the ACA; those regulations were recently issued after public notice and comment, and
they contain detailed requirements implementing the specific procedural criteria
mandated by section 1332 of the Act. See Application, Review, and Reporting Process for
Waivers for State Innovation, 77 Fed. Reg. 11,700 (Feb. 27, 2012) (to be codified at 31
C.F.R. pt. 33 and 45 C.F.R. pt. 155).
83. ACA, § 1332(b) (requiring, among other things, that the State plan provide
coverage at least as comprehensive as that required under the ACA).
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Services-and it constrains that agent's discretion by requiring both
burdensome administrative procedures and detailed substantive
criteria before the agent may exercise the delegated power. Those
substantive criteria, in turn, provide reviewing courts with specific
standards by which they can determine whether the waivers were
properly granted.
Despite the similarities between administrative rulemaking and
the ACA waiver process, this Article argues that bicameralism and
presentment require that the exercise of such a broad waiver power
should receive greater judicial scrutiny than would the promulgation
of regulations necessary to flesh out the Act. At first blush, this
makes little sense, since a court reviewing a separation of powers
challenge to the Executive's waivers under the ACA would likely
uphold them under nondelegation doctrine." That doctrine is
founded on a pragmatic, functionalist view of the separation of
powers." Such a functionalist view, however, rather than a formalist
one, is less appropriate when Congress delegates the power to negate
legislative bargains struck pursuant to our meticulous constitutional
structure."
The Court's formalist view of lawmaking delegations has not had
much effect in the lower courts." Nor has the Court chosen to expand
its bicameralism and presentment jurisprudence since it struck down
the LIVA. But the principle undergirding Clinton should limit
lawmaking delegations such as the waiver provision in the ACA.
Waiver delegations have become more common as Congress seeks to
allow flexibility to avoid the burdens of its increasingly complex
84. See supra Part IA.
85. See Manning, supra note 35, at 1950-58 (2011) (outlining functionalist principles
and giving examples of functionalist reasoning in Supreme Court decisions); see also Mark
Tushnet, The Sentencing Commission and Constitutional Theory: Bowls and Plateaus in
Separation of Powers Theory, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 581, 582-85, 592-97 (discussing
functionalism in the context of separation of powers theory).
86. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 919 (1983); Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S.
417 (1998); see also Manning, supra note 35, at 1943-44. But see Linda D. Jellum, "Which
Is to Be Master," the Judiciary or the Legislature? When Statutory Directives Violate
Separation of Powers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 837, 878-79 (2009) (arguing that separation of
powers jurisprudence "vacillates between" and sometimes even blends elements of
formalism and functionalism, all in the name of protecting liberty by preventing "tyranny
and legislative aggrandizement").
87. See infra Part III.
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statutory schemes, leading to modest scholarly attention by a few
recent commentators."
Rather than examine waiver provisions in isolation, this Article
views them more broadly within a novel framework that categorizes
lawmaking delegations as either positive or negative. Negative
lawmaking delegations raise greater separation of powers concerns
than do positive ones because such delegations allow unilateral
executive discretion to undo the legislative bargains embodied in
congressional statutes.
A. The Positive/Negative Dichotomy
There are two basic forms of lawmaking power delegable to the
Executive by Congress. The first is a positive power. The positive
power involves the Executive's delegated authority to create legal
rules or standards, generally through administrative rulemaking."
Rules promulgated pursuant to such delegated authority have the
same functional characteristics as statutes." Indeed, the
Administrative Procedure Act's ("APA") definition of a rule-a
"statement of general or particular applicability and future effect
designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy" 9-could
easily describe most statutes as well.92 Though the functional
characteristics of administrative rules and statutes are the same,
under modern doctrine, Congress has great latitude in determining
the precision with which it legislates. A statute may contain broad
goals and delegate the task of specifying the details to an
88. E.g., Kate R. Bowers, Saying What the Law Isn't: Legislative Delegations of
Waiver Authority in Environmental Laws, 34 HARV. ENvTL. L. REV. 257 (2010); Bryan
Clark, Comment, Refining the Nondelegation Doctrine in Light of REAL ID Act Section
102(c): Time to Stop Bulldozing Constitutional Barriers for A Border Fence, 58 CATH. U.
L. REv. 851 (2009); Andrew Dudley, Comment, Opening Borders: Congressional
Delegation of Discretionary Authority to Suspend or Repeal the Laws of the United States,
41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 273 (2009).
89. Prakash, supra note 25, at 4.
90. See Ariz. Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 284 U.S. 370, 386
(1932) (explaining that an agency exercising delegated lawmaking authority "speaks as the
legislature, and its pronouncement has the force of a statute"); see also Peter L. Strauss,
The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J. 1463, 1477 (1992) (noting that "legislative rules
have the force of statutes if validly adopted").
91. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2006).
92. Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 731,
796 n.118 (2010) (noting that "agency lawmaking is quite indistinguishable from
congressional lawmaking so far as the citizen is concerned").
administrative agency, or a statute may contain precise text with
specific rules."
This Article uses the term "lawmaking authority" or "lawmaking
delegation" generally to describe delegations that grant legislative-
type discretion to the Executive-namely, the power to amend or
alter the legal rights and duties of individuals or the ways in which
government operates. Delegations of legislative-type power to the
Executive are then grouped into two categories: positive and
negative. In the constitutional structure, amendment or repeal of
existing law, no less than enactment of new law, requires an exercise
of Congress's lawmaking power under Article I.94 The idea that
lawmaking involves the creation, modification, or rescission of text
that has legal force or effect is also evident in administrative law."
Thus, the term "positive" refers to the use of lawmaking power to add
to a statutory scheme or otherwise fill in the interstices of broad
statutory mandates. The power is positive in the sense that it adds to
or elaborates upon existing statutory text, rather than modifies,
cancels, or otherwise negates it.
The second form of delegable lawmaking power is a negative
power. The negative power involves the Executive's delegated
authority to deny legal force or effect to statutory text that has been
duly enacted through bicameralism and presentment." There are a
variety of examples of the negative power, including: the power to
determine when given statutory text will take effect,' the power to
amend or modify statutory text,98 the power to waive the application
93. Beermann, supra note 35, at 78. Professor Beermann explains: "For example,
Congress may legislate precise limits on the emission of pollutants from automobiles, or it
may set a goal of cleaner air and rely on an agency to establish the precise limits." Id.
94. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,954 (1983),
95. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (defining "rule making" as the "agency process for
formulating, amending, or repealing a rule").
96. Both positive and negative lawmaking power can be and have been delegated to
the Judiciary by Congress in the Rules Enabling Act. See supra note 65.
97. Professor Lawson calls this contingent legislation. Lawson, supra note 30, at 363.
For more on contingent legislation and Lawson's framework, see infra Part II.B.1. I
characterize such legislation as conferring a negative power because the Executive can
exercise discretion that prevents statutory text, duly enacted under the meticulous
procedures of Article I, Section 7, from taking effect.
98. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14(c) (2006) (authorizing the Secretary of Health and
Human Services to "promulgate regulations to modify" the Vaccine Injury Table
contained in the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act). Although I characterize
modification authority as negative due to its effect on pre-existing statutory text, it is also
positive in the sense that it creates new legal rules or standards that take the place of the
pre-modification provision.
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of statutes in specified instances," and the power to permanently
cancel the legal effect of statutory provisions.'t"
While implied but never fully explained by Clinton, the
Executive's exercise of power to cancel or modify statutes is far more
problematic than the Executive's now-ubiquitous promulgation of
positive law, a practice that expands upon or fills in the gaps of
existing statutes.'0' As a result, the Court less rigorously analyzes
positive lawmaking delegations to the Executive than negative
lawmaking delegations of equivalent scope. Commentators have
similarly failed to provide an analytically sound explanation for the
differing treatment of such delegations. The next subpart further
elaborates on the distinction between positive and negative
lawmaking delegations, breaking down negative lawmaking
delegations into four distinct types. Each type of negative lawmaking
delegation raises separation of powers concerns in light of the
constitutional text and structure.
B. The Different Types of Negative Lawmaking Delegations
The degree to which Congress may delegate negative lawmaking
power is limited only by Congress's creativity (and willingness) to
delegate its discretion to another Branch. Nevertheless, a more
formal categorization of negative lawmaking delegations, a task never
99. See, e.g., Save Our Heritage Org. v. Gonzalez, 533 F. Supp. 2d 58, 59-60 (2008)
(approving the Secretary of Homeland Security's authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1103 to
"waive all legal requirements . . . necessary to ensure expeditious construction of the
barriers and roads under this section.").
100. See Line Item Veto Act, Pub. L. No. 104-130, § 691(a), 110 Stat. 1200, 1200
(1996), invalidated by Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (allowing the
president to "cancel in whole" certain spending and tax-benefit provisions).
101. The President may have independent constitutional authority under Article II to
provide the necessary details to complete an otherwise incomplete legislative scheme.
Compare Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President's Completion Power, 115
YALE L.J. 2280, 2282 (2006) ("The completion power is the President's authority to
prescribe incidental details needed to carry into execution a legislative scheme, even in the
absence of any congressional authorization to complete that scheme."), with Robert J.
Reinstein, The Limits of Executive Power, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 259, 264 (2009) (rejecting the
concept of a presidential completion power as "the modem equivalent of a royal
prerogative that was asserted and discredited 400 years ago-that the King could, by
proclamation and without legislative authorization, change domestic law by prescribing
means that he deemed necessary to make a statutory scheme more effective"). The merits
of a presidential completion power are intriguing, though it seems that at least some
power to fill in the interstices of incomplete statutory mandates must be incidental to the
execution of law even in the absence of express congressional authorization, particularly
where Congress often legislates at a high level of abstraction, eschewing particularized
instruction in favor of broad, goal-specifying legislation.
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undertaken by the Court nor comprehensively attempted by
commentators, helps better ground the analysis of such delegations
within the constitutional text and structure governing separation of
powers doctrine.
This Article proceeds by analyzing negative lawmaking
delegations in a proposed classification of four broad types:
contingent legislation, amendment, waiver, and cancellation.
1. Contingent Legislation
In Clinton, the Court referred to "Congress itself ma[king] the
decision to repeal prior rules upon the occurrence of a particular"
event. Justice Breyer's dissent argued that the LIVA itself was a type
of contingent legislation, no different than myriad other statutes
delegating "to the President or to others ... a contingent power to
deny effect to certain statutory language." 02
Although Clinton did not fully address the issue of contingent
legislation, nor has the Court ever done so, one prominent
commentator defines such legislation as statutes in which Congress
decides the statute shall be effective (or rendered ineffective) when
the President or another actor determines that a certain contingency
has occurred, rather than fixing the effective date of the statute to a
calendar date.o Contingent legislation allows Congress not merely to
set the initial effective date of a statute, but also to create the
functional equivalent of a statutory on/off switch that can be flipped
by executive or judicial agents. The flipping of the switch is generally
not lawmaking because "Congress determine[s] the conditions under
which the statute w[ill] be effective but le[aves] it to [an agent] to
determine whether those conditions [are] satisfied."'" Such
delegation is constitutional unless determining the conditions under
which the statute is effective "passes beyond the implementational
function of executive and judicial agents and instead becomes
lawmaking."O
102. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 476 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (listing examples of contingent
legislation).
103. Lawson, supra note 30, at 363-68.
104. Id. at 364.
105. Id. at 387. In Professor Lawson's view: "If the President simply decides on an
effective date, he is making a law. If he determines the existence vel non of an external
fact, he is executing a law (provided that the determination does not require so much
discretion that it crosses the line into lawmaking). If he makes some decision other than
the effective date that consequentially establishes the effective date, the lines get very
blurry. All of this merely proves once again that hard cases are hard." Id. at 391.
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The Supreme Court's first case on contingent legislation, decided
in 1813, involved a statute that required forfeiture of cargo imported
from Great Britain or France, unless the President declared by
proclamation that either Great Britain or France had "cease[d] to
violate the neutral commerce of the United States.""6 The statutory
prohibition requiring cargo forfeiture was switched off when the
President so proclaimed, but the President's switch was dependent on
his determination of the existence of an external fact, which was
sufficient to make the President's exercise of discretion
*107
constitutional.
The second case involving contingent legislation, distinguished
by Clinton when it invalidated the LIVA, was Field v. Clark, which
evaluated the Tariff Act of 1890.'0 The Act exempted certain goods
from import duties but directed the President to suspend those
exemptions by proclamation whenever he determined that another
country was imposing "reciprocally unequal and unreasonable" duties
on those goods." The Act then provided for import duties to be
levied during the presidential suspension of the exemptions."o
Analyzing a constitutional challenge to the Act, the Court held
that delegating discretion as to whether a statute should be executed
was permissible, but delegating discretion as to the content of the law
was not." Relying heavily on the historical practice of delegating
106. Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382, 383 (1813).
107. Lawson, supra note 30, at 387 ("The President has, of course, some measure of
discretion in determining whether the actions of Great Britain amount to violations of
neutral commerce, but the extent of that discretion is no greater than in run-of-the-mill
cases involving matters other than effective dates."). The implication of the statute in
Cargo of the Brig Aurora is that, if the President mistakenly determined that Great Britain
was no longer violating neutral commerce or began violating neutral commerce again after
the President's proclamation, then the President could revive operation of the statutory
prohibition on importation by revoking his proclamation. In other words, the effective
date of the statute would turn on whether Great Britain was violating neutral commerce,
as determined by the President, and thus the statute would switch on or off depending on
the President's determination of an external fact. Since the external fact could change
back and forth, so could the President's determination, and thus the operation of the
statute.
108. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
109. Act of Oct. 1, 1890, 26 Stat. 567 (1890).
110. Id.
111. Field, 143 U.S. at 693-94. Of course, Congress now regularly delegates to the
Executive the discretion to determine the content of laws. Indeed, the very premise of
Chevron deference is that textual ambiguity in a statute which an agency administers
constitutes delegated interpretive authority to clarify that ambiguity with text that has the
full force or effect of law. See infra note 252.
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similar suspension authority to the President, the Court concluded
that the delegation was constitutional."'
The government in Clinton argued that the LIVA was similar to
the Tariff Act of 1890 and, thus, constitutional. The two statutes
containing the cancelled spending provisions-the Balanced Budget
Act and the Taxpayer Relief Act-were passed subsequent to the
LIVA, but should be construed as including the LIVA's item veto
authority in their terms."3  The President's cancellation of the
spending items was therefore an exercise of discretionary authority
granted in the spending bills. This power, contended the government,
was similar to the discretionary suspension authority granted in the
Tariff Act of 1890, rather than the amendment of subsequently
enacted statutes using a power delegated previously.
Clinton found several ways to distinguish the LIVA from the
Tariff Act. First, the Tariff Act granted the President the suspension
power contingent upon conditions not present when the Act was
enacted."' Because the LIVA required the President to exercise the
cancellation authority within five days after the spending provisions
were enacted, the conditions under which Congress enacted the
statute were the same. Second, the President had a "duty" to suspend
the tariff exemptions when he determined that the specified
contingency had occurred, while the three presidential determinations
required under the LIVA "did not qualify his discretion to cancel or
not to cancel."' Third, under the Tariff Act the President
"execut[ed] the policy that Congress had embodied in the statute,"
while under the LIVA he "reject[ed] the policy judgment made by
Congress and rel[ied] on his own policy judgment."" 6
The Court's attempt to distinguish the LIVA from the Tariff Act
of 1890 is unpersuasive. First, under Article I, Section 7, it is
irrelevant that Field v. Clark involved changed conditions after
112. Id. at 683 ("If we find that [C]ongress has frequently, from the organization of the
government to the present time, conferred upon the president powers, with reference to
trade and commerce, like those conferred by [this Act], that fact is entitled to great weight
in determining the question before us."). The Court reasoned that "it is often desirable, if
not essential, for the protection of the interests of our people against the unfriendly or
discriminating regulations established by foreign governments, in the interest of their
people, to invest the president with large discretion in matters arising out of the execution
of statutes relating to trade and commerce with other nations." Id.
113. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 442 (1998).
114. Id. at 443 (the imposition of "reciprocally unequal and unreasonable" import
duties by other countries.).
115. Id. at 443-44.
116. Id. at 444.
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enactment, while the LIVA involved the same conditions as during
enactment. If it is the effect on statutory text that matters, then any
cancellation allows partial repeal of statutes without bicameralism
and presentment.
Second, the duty/discretion distinction does not change the fact
that the delegated power negates statutory text; surely the LIVA
would have been equally unconstitutional under the Court's analysis
if the Act instead mandated cancellation upon presidential
determination of the three requirements set forth in the Act."1 1
Finally, the executing versus abrogating congressional policy
judgment argument is a false distinction. It assumes that the spending
provisions enacted subsequent to the LIVA did not embody the
policy of the LIVA-namely, a policy of fiscal discretion and an
understanding that the President was better equipped to make line-
item determinations than a multimember deliberative body such as
118Congress."
Congress's decision not to exempt the subsequent spending bills
from the LIVA could easily be characterized as Congress deciding to
embody the policy of the LIVA in those bills. Although the Court
did not purport to analyze either the Tariff Act or the LIVA as
"contingent legislation" in such explicit terms, many commentators,
and some members of the Court,"9 rely on the contingent legislation
framework.
Even assuming the contingent legislation framework is viable,
this framework does not answer the larger question of whether
negative lawmaking delegations are generally constitutional. A
statute giving the President the power to cancel certain provisions
"whenever he feels like it," even under the weak intelligible principle
standard, would be unlikely to pass muster, although it is certainly
"contingent" in the ordinary sense of the word. Whatever the
specified contingency is, when the President prevents a statute from
taking effect, or when he switches the statute off, as he did with the
117. It is also unclear just how "mandatory" the suspension duty was in the tariff
statutes. See id. at 493-94 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining how some of the tariff
statutes imposed no duty, while "[o]thers imposed a 'duty' in terms so vague as to leave
substantial discretion in the President's hands").
118. See id. ("The majority also tries to distinguish [Field v. Clark] on the ground that
the President there executed congressional policy while here he rejects that policy. The
President here, however, in exercising his delegated authority does not reject congressional
policy. Rather, he executes a law in which Congress has specified its desire that the
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Tariff Act in Field v. Clark, he is unilaterally negating statutory text.
Accordingly, contingent legislation implicates the Article I, Section 7
test, and therefore should be evaluated with greater scrutiny than
positive lawmaking delegations of equivalent scope.
2. Amendment
Chadha held that "amendment and repeal of statutes, no less
than enactment, must conform with Art. I,". and Clinton reiterated
that it is unconstitutional to give the President "the unilateral power
to change the text of duly enacted statutes.""' In the negative
lawmaking delegation framework, amendment power involves the
Executive's delegated authority to modify, in whole or in part,
statutory text.
The Supreme Court has never directly confronted the question
whether amendment delegations violate Article I, Section 7, but in
one case the Court implied that such delegations may be
constitutional. The delegation at issue allowed the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") to "modify any requirement"
made by a particular section of the Communications Act of 1934."
Invoking its modification authority, the FCC eliminated, for over
forty percent of the industry, a rate-filing requirement statutorily
imposed on the entire industry.' The Supreme Court, largely based
on a textualist analysis of the term "modify," held that the FCC's
action was too great to be considered a "modification" and that the
agency therefore exceeded its regulatory authority under the Act. 24
The clear implication is that less drastic changes would have been
permissible.
Other amendment delegations have been challenged in court
subsequent to Clinton and are addressed in further detail in Part
III.B. Such delegations implicate the negative lawmaking framework
because they allow an executive actor to override statutory text with
new text never subjected to the lawmaking requirements of Article I,
Section 7. When the executive actor-usually an administrative
120. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954 (1983).
121. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 447.
122. MCI Telecommc'ns. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 220 (1994)
(citing 47 U.S.C. § 203(b)(2) (1998 ed. & Supp. IV)).
123. MCI, 512 U.S. at 231-32.
124. See MCI, 512 U.S. at 228 ("It might be good English to say that the French
Revolution 'modified' the status of the French nobility-but only because there is a figure
of speech called understatement and a literary device known as sarcasm.").
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agency-promulgates superseding text, the old text no longer has
legal force or effect, at least not prospectively. The result is
functionally equivalent to Congress exercising its lawmaking power
under Article I, Section 7 to amend a statute.
3. Waiver
Waiver provisions, because they are unique to and highly shaped
by the statutory scheme in which they appear, are difficult to describe
as a class. To the extent that there has been academic commentary
on the Executive's use of statutory waivers, the commentary has
focused on their use in specific substantive areas of law, rather than
on their general constitutional validity.12 1
In any event, "waiver" refers to a statutory provision exempting
certain persons, projects, or categories of activities from some or all
of the requirements of the statute in which the provision appears, or
of other statutes.12 1 When the waiver provision grants the Executive
discretion as to whether and to whom to grant the waiver, the
exercise of the delegated waiver authority involves executive negation
of statutory text. Depending on the scope of such provisions, the
Executive can determine if the waiver should be granted, to whom or
for which activities, and to what extent other laws will not apply.
Waiver provisions can be internal or external. Internal waiver
provisions allow the Executive to suspend all or part of the law of
which they are a part."2 External waiver provisions allow the
Executive to suspend the requirements of other laws." Both types of
waiver provisions generally do four things. First, they identify which
executive official may grant the waiver-for example, the Secretary of
Defense or the President." Second, waiver provisions prescribe the
substantive criteria that must be met before the waiver can be
granted.3 o These criteria run the gamut from detailed and specific to
125. See supra note 88.
126. See Bowers, supra note 88, at 261-62 nn.15-19.
127. Id. at 264 n.34. The description of waiver provisions draws largely on Bowers,
supra note 88, at 261, 264-71.
128. E.g., Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-11, § 1503, 117 Stat. 559, 579 (authorizing the President to "make
inapplicable with respect to Iraq... any other provision of law that applies to countries
that have supported terrorism") (emphasis added).
129. Bowers, supra note 88, at 265.
130. E.g., ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1332(b), 124 Stat. 119, 203 (2010) (requiring,
among other things, that the State plan provide coverage at least as comprehensive as that
required under the ACA).
open-ended and vague."' Third, the waiver provisions lay out the
procedural requirements for requesting and granting the waiver, to
the extent there are any.' Finally, the provisions often specify the
availability and scope of judicial review. 3
Executive exercise of waiver authority to negate the legal force
or effect of statutory text potentially undermines whatever legislative
compromise was necessary to enact the negated text through
bicameralism and presentment, and thus such waivers implicate the
negative lawmaking delegation framework.
4. Cancellation
Cancellation authority involves the Executive's delegated
authority to permanently rescind the legal force or effect of statutory
provisions.' The LIVA is the paradigmatic example of such
delegated authority. Given the Court's decision in Clinton, it is
unlikely that Congress will attempt to fashion a similar cancellation
provision in future statutes. To the extent that Congress may wish to
delegate a functionally similar negative power, it will likely do so
using a textual formulation that more closely mirrors waiver or
contingent legislation, since both exist in other statutes and have a
firmer place in our historical tradition. Alternatively, as Justice Scalia
noted in his Clinton dissent, Congress could, at least in the budgetary
context, simply appropriate a discretionary lump sum."' A
presidential choice not to spend part of that sum would be
functionally equivalent to the line item veto's effect. Even though
131. Compare ACA, § 1332(b) (detailing comprehensive substantive criteria necessary
before granting a waiver), with REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 102(c), 119
Stat. 231, 302 (allowing the Secretary of Homeland Security to waive the effect of any law
with respect to construction of a border fence when he determines it is "necessary to
ensure expeditious construction").
132. E.g., ACA, § 1332(a)(4) (requiring, among other things, public notice and
comment, including public hearings; a detailed application; and development of a process
for thorough reporting, monitoring, and evaluation); REAL ID Act § 102(c) (requiring no
procedure except for publication in the Federal Register within thirty days of the
Secretary's exercise of the waiver authority).
133. E.g., REAL ID Act § 102(c)(2) (granting exclusive jurisdiction to federal district
courts and only allowing constitutional claims, prescribing timeframe for filing claims, and
limiting appellate review to the Supreme Court).
134. See Prakash, supra note 25 at 4 n.19.
135. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 466 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("Insofar as the degree of political, 'lawmaking' power
conferred upon the Executive is concerned, there is not a dime's worth of difference
between Congress's authorizing the President to cancel a spending item, and Congress's
authorizing money to be spent on a particular item at the President's discretion.").
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Clinton makes future cancellation delegations unlikely, their inclusion
in the negative lawmaking delegation framework is necessary to help
illuminate why the LIVA violated Article I, Section 7 given
bicameralism and presentment's purposes, rather than solely because
the President was "changing" statutory text.
III. Post-Clinton Challenges to Negative Lawmaking
Delegations
This Part surveys lower court decisions in which lawmaking
delegations have been challenged using Clinton's Article I, Section 7
test. It shows that the test has had limited impact on courts, even
where the delegation at issue was similar to that in Clinton-that is, it
allowed statutory text to be negated. Because Clinton drew tenuous
distinctions, however, subsequent courts have elided bicameralism
and presentment by distinguishing other negative lawmaking
delegations from the one in the LIVA.
A. Waiver
1. The REAL ID Act: The Border Fence Puzzle
That bicameralism and presentment is required to amend and
repeal statutes, no less than to enact them, is an uncontroversial
proposition. But when the Executive has congressionally delegated
authority to negate any statutes that conflict with a tangible objective,
is it amending or partially repealing the conflicting statutes when it
exercises discretion to negate them? This is the crux of the question
presented by Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff's
decision to waive the requirements of dozens of laws that he
determined impeded the expeditious construction of a fence along the
U.S.-Mexico border.37
In the REAL ID Act of 2005, Congress delegated waiver power
to the Executive to facilitate construction of the border fence:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the
Secretary of Homeland Security shall have the
136. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954 (1983).
137. See County of El Paso v. Chertoff, 2008 WL 4372693 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2008);
Save Our Heritage Org. v. Gonzales, 533 F. Supp. 2d 58 (D.D.C. 2008); Defenders of
Wildlife v. Chertoff, 527 F. Supp. 2d 119 (D.D.C. 2007); Sierra Club v. Ashcroft, 2005 U.S.
Dist. Lexis 44244 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 12,2005). The decision in Defenders of Wildlife sparked
modest academic interest in the problem of negative lawmaking delegations. See, e.g.,
Clark, supra note 88; Dudley, supra note 88.
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authority to waive all legal requirements such
Secretary, in such Secretary's sole discretion,
determines necessary to ensure expeditious
construction of the barriers and roads under this
section. Any such decision by the Secretary shall be
effective upon being published in the Federal
Register.'3 8
After a district court preliminarily enjoined fence construction
based on a likely violation of both the National Environmental Policy
Act and the Arizona-Idaho Conservation Act of 1988, Secretary
Chertoff exercised his authority to waive both Acts, along with over a
dozen other laws, presumably as a preemptive strike to prevent
further litigation.1" The plaintiffs challenged the waiver authority,
arguing that it: (1) violated Clinton's Article I, Section 7 test; and (2)
was an impermissibly standardless delegation of legislative power.
The court rejected both arguments. First, the court distinguished
waiver from the partial repeal or amendment in Clinton: the LIVA
gave the President "'the unilateral power to change the text of duly
enacted statutes,"'14 whereas the REAL ID Act gave the Secretary
"no authority to alter the text of any statute, repeal any law, or cancel
any statutory provision, in whole or in part.',14 2  According to
Defenders of Wildlife, each cancelled provision in Clinton "no longer
ha[d] any 'legal force or effect' under any circumstance," 4 1 but
"[e]ach of the twenty laws waived by the Secretary ... retains the
same legal force and effect as it had when it was passed by both
houses of Congress and presented to the President."
Second, the court, citing the intelligible principle line of cases,
found the REAL ID Act clearly delineated its general policy and
sufficiently cabined the Secretary's discretion by allowing him to
"waive only those laws that he determines 'necessary to ensure
138. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 102(c), 119 Stat. 231, 302.
139. The Secretary also waived eighteen other laws "in their entirety, with respect to
the construction of roads and fixed and mobile barriers [in the disputed area]." 72 Fed.
Reg. 60,870 (Oct. 26, 2007). Some of the other laws waived include the Endangered
Species Act; the Clean Water Act; the Safe Drinking Water Act; the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act; and the Administrative
Procedure Act. Id.
140. Defenders of Wildlife, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 124-26.
141. Id. at 124 (quoting Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417,446-47 (1998)).
142. Id.
143. Id. (quoting Clinton, 524 U.S. at 437).
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expeditious construction.""" Other district courts evaluating the
REAL ID Act waivers adopted similar nondelegation reasoning.145
And in the only other case in which the plaintiffs also alleged a
violation of Article I, Section 7, the court adopted Defenders of
Wildlife's analysis to reject that argument. 146
Defenders of Wildlife was wrong to suggest that the LIVA was
distinguishable because the statutory text President Clinton cancelled
no longer had legal force or effect "under any circumstance." As
Clinton made clear, the cancelled text retained some legal effect
(there, a real budgetary effect on the federal government), but that
effect was insufficient to save the LIVA from unconstitutionality.
And though both the item veto power and the REAL ID Act waivers
share the formal negative effect on statutory text, what is different,
and thus interesting, about the REAL ID Act waivers is the nature of
the delegated negative lawmaking power. It was narrow in physical
scope, applying only for the purpose of ensuring "expeditious
construction" of the border fence, construction of which was
expressly limited to "areas of high illegal entry."' But it was
expansive in legal scope, allowing the DHS Secretary to,
"notwithstanding any other provision of law," waive any law that he
determined in his "sole discretion" impeded the expeditious
construction of the border fence. The statute effectively delegated
unlimited cancellation authority, applicable to every provision of the
United States Code, limited only by the constraints inherent in the
goal of constructing the border fence. The power to cancel other law
was also limited temporally, though somewhat indefinitely, by the
projected completion time for the border fence project.
Though the plaintiffs cleverly framed the REAL ID Act waiver
authority as functionally equivalent to the partial repeal authority
invalidated in Clinton, the REAL ID Act specifically used the term
144. Id. at 127 (quoting REAL ID Act of 2005, § 102(c), 119 Stat. 231, 302). Because
the Supreme Court found a delegation to the Environmental Protection Agency to set air
quality standards at a level "requisite to protect public health" contained a sufficiently
intelligible principle, then the "necessary to ensure expeditious construction" standard of
the REAL ID Act was also sufficiently intelligible; Congress did not need to define
"necessary" in greater detail. Id. at 127 (citing Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S.
457, 465 (2001)).
145. See County of El Paso v. Chertoff, 2008 WL 4372693 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2008);
Save Our Heritage Org. v. Gonzales, 533 F. Supp. 2d 58 (D.D.C. 2008); Sierra Club v.
Ashcroft, 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 44244 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2005).
146. County of El Paso, 2008 WL 4372693, at *3-*4 (citing Defenders of Wildlife, 527
F. Supp. 2d at 124).
147. Defenders of Wildlife, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 128 (citation omitted).
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"waiver."m8 The distinction between permissible waiver authority and
impermissible partial repeal or cancellation authority is difficult to
formulate with precision, but, at least in the realm of foreign affairs
and other powers considered within the independent purview of the
Executive,149 the Court has consistently rejected separation of powers
challenges to statutory provisions delegating waiver authority to the
Executive.5 o Because the border fence is related to national security
and immigration, the Executive's independent powers in those realms
may further mitigate concern over the REAL ID Act waivers.'
148. The plaintiffs in Defenders of Wildlife argued that the waiver was functionally
equivalent to a partial repeal because the laws waived were "repeal[ed] ... to the extent
that they otherwise would have applied to [the construction of the border fence]. 527 F.
Supp. 2d at 124 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).
149. For example, the realm of national security is traditionally considered the
Executive's as part of the Commander-in-Chief power under Article II, Section 2, Clause
1. See Dep't of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988) (explaining that the national-
security power of the Executive "flows primarily from this constitutional investment of
power in the President and exists quite apart from any explicit congressional grant").
Similar reasoning is found in the Court's decisions relaxing the intelligible principle
standard in contexts in which the Executive traditionally has exercised independent
authority. See, e.g., Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 750 (1996) (rejecting
nondelegation challenge because the statute at issue involved military affairs, traditionally
within the prerogative of the Executive and noting that "[h]ad the delegations here called
for the exercise of judgment or discretion that lies beyond the traditional authority of the
President," Loving's last argument that Congress failed to provide guiding principles to
the President "might have more weight").
150. See, e.g., Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, 556 U.S. 848, 861 (2009) ("The [statute]
expressly allowed the President to render certain statutes inapplicable .... And it did not
repeal anything, but merely granted the President authority to waive the application of
particular statutes to a single foreign nation.") (emphasis in original). The Court
explained: "To a layperson, the notion of the President's suspending the operation of a
valid law might seem strange. But the practice is well established, at least in the sphere of
foreign affairs." Id. at 856-57 (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S.
304, 322-24 (1936)). The Court, noting that the statute granted the President the authority
to waive an exception to foreign sovereign immunity, explained that "granting or denial of
that immunity was historically the case-by-case prerogative of the Executive Branch." Id.
(citing Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 586-90 (1943)).
151. See Lawson, supra note 30, at 387-95 (discussing how when "Congress is merely
charging executive agents with the exercise of executive power, there is no constitutional
problem"); cf Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-39 (1952)
(Jackson, J. concurring) (discussing the role of the President's independent powers vis-A-
vis Congress's lawmaking powers); Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 305, 315-20 ("The broad
statement that the federal government can exercise no powers except those specifically
enumerated in the Constitution, and such implied powers as are necessary and proper to
carry into effect the enumerated powers, is categorically true only in respect of our
internal affairs.... It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not alone with
an authority vested in the President by an exertion of legislative power, but with such an
authority plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole
organ of the federal government in the field of international relations-a power which
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More broadly, however, the REAL ID Act waiver authority is
functionally equivalent to the cancellation authority resoundingly
struck down by Clinton. Waivers allow the Executive to deny legal
force or effect to statutory text, often with few limitations provided by
Congress to constrain the Executive's discretion.152 Consider again
the 50-state waiver of the ACA's legal requirements promised by
Governor Romney. The ACA waiver, unlike the REAL ID Act
waiver, is an internal waiver-that is, it only waives other provisions
does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress...."). The Court has used
the theory in Curtiss-Wright to justify exercises of presidential power in ways that
otherwise might seem to evade the strictures of the Constitution. See, e.g., United States
v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); Regan v.
Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984); see generally Anthony Simones, The Reality of Curtiss-Wright,
16 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 411, 412 (1996). It is a theory, moreover, that has been heavily
criticized. See generally Michael D. Ramsey, The Myth of Extraconstitutional Foreign
Affairs Power, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 379 (2000) (discussing the broad range of
scholarly criticism of Curtiss-Wright and contending that the Court was wrong to suggest
that the Constitution was drafted against a "background of extraconstitutional powers in
foreign affairs").
Although I note the tendency of the Court to rely on independent executive authority in
certain areas, such as foreign affairs and national security, I express no opinion on the
relative merits and demerits of such a position, nor do I intend to enter the debate on the
source of the President's powers in these realms. The debate has already spawned scores
of works on the subject. See, e.g., HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY
CONSTITUTION (1990); G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional
Regime of Foreign Relations, 85 VA. L. REV. 1 (1999); Michael J. Glennon, Two Views of
Presidential Foreign Affairs Power: Little v. Barreme or Curtiss-Wright, 13 YALE J. INT'L
L. 5 (1988); H. Jefferson Powell, The President's Authority over Foreign Affairs: An
Executive Branch Perspective, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 527 (1999); Sarah H. Cleveland,
The Plenary Power Background of Curtiss-Wright, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1127 (1999).
152. For example, Congress has granted broad waiver authority in Medicaid:
Section 1115 empowers the Secretary to waive the requirements of
specific sections in the [Social Security Act]-including section 1902 of
title XIX (the Medicaid title)-for any "experimental, pilot or
demonstration project which, in the judgment of the Secretary, is likely
to assist in promoting the objectives of title ... XIX of this chapter ...
in a state or states." The Secretary may waive the provision "to the
extent and for the period he finds necessary to enable such State or
States to carry out such project." Section 1115 contains no procedural
requirements that the Secretary must follow, nor does it provide any
criteria on which the Secretary must base his decision, beyond the
general language quoted above.
Jonathan R. Bolton, The Case of the Disappearing Statute: A Legal and Policy Critique of
the Use of Section 1115 Waivers to Restructure the Medicaid Program, 37 COLUM. J.L. &
SOC. PROBS. 91, 98-99 (2003) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2000)). Though the text of the
statute and legislative history provided little guidance on the types of experimental
projects that were envisioned as appropriate for granting waiver requests, the waivers
were broadly sought by and granted to states in ways that dramatically reformed state
Medicaid programs. See id. at 99-101.
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within the same statute. It also has greater administrative procedures
and more detailed substantive criteria to limit executive discretion
than the REAL ID Act waiver.
Despite these limitations, the ACA waiver power is far broader
than the REAL ID Act waiver power, which applied only to a
tangible national security project. State innovation waivers under the
ACA undo much of the statutory scheme for health insurance
requirements in every state granted a waiver. Governor Romney's
hypothetical 50-state waiver amounts to effective repeal of much of
the statute, thereby allowing him to change the text of the duly
enacted ACA by rendering legally inoperative large swaths of its text,
all without the process of bicameralism and presentment.
An external waiver, as in Defenders of Wildlife, effectively
amends the waived external statutes to contain an exception for
border fence construction. Secretary Chertoff exercised discretion as
to when and where the United States Code was amended to contain
exceptions for the border fence project. The REAL ID Act also did
not limit the waiver authority to statutes enacted prior to the REAL
ID Act; the Secretary presumably could have waived the
requirements of subsequently enacted statutes."' Indeed, allowing
the Secretary to waive any law granted the Secretary broad discretion
to negate not only federal law, but state and local law as well.54
The broad deference ordinarily afforded to the Executive's
waiver decisions means statutory challenges alleging the waiver
exceeded the bounds of the statute's grant will usually fail."' And
153. One might argue that the REAL ID Act effectively amends older statutes to
contain a provision exempting the border fence project from their requirements upon a
determination by the Secretary that such exemption is necessary to ensure expeditious
construction of the border fence. That argument does not work, however, where a statute
enacted after the REAL ID Act is waived by the Secretary using his REAL ID Act
authority.
154. See Determination Pursuant to Section 102 of the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 18,293 (Apr. 3, 2008) (waiving "all
federal, state, or other laws, regulations and legal requirements of, deriving from, or
related to the subject of" 37 federal laws). Tenth Amendment-based federalism
challenges to these waivers have failed in the district courts. See, e.g., County of El Paso v.
Chertoff, 2008 WL 4372693, at *9-10 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2008).
155. See, e.g., Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090, 1105 (2d Cir. 1973) (upholding
the exercise of section 1115 Medicaid waiver authority so long as the Secretary had a
"rational basis for determining that the programs were 'likely to assist in promoting the
objectives' of [the statute]"). The repeated use of the Executive's waiver authority under
section 1115 under the deferential standard of review set forth in Aguayo has led to an
increasing waiver of compliance with many provisions of the Medicaid title of the Social
Security Act, "effectively giv[ing] the executive branch the power to change the text of
duly enacted statutes." Bolton, supra note 152, at 98-101, 172.
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unless Congress fails to provide any standard at all, the statute will
have an intelligible principle sufficient to pass constitutional muster.
The imprecision of the Article I, Section 7 test is also
problematic. Where is the line between impermissible amendment or
repeal of statutes without bicameralism and presentment and
permissible waiver of statutes as an element of law execution? Why
was the President "chang[ing] the text of duly enacted statutes" when
he exercised his LIVA cancellation authority, but Secretary Chertoff
was not when he exercised his waiver authority under the REAL ID
Act? These questions are explored further in Part V.
2. A Note on Executive Enforcement Discretion
Further muddying the waters for waiver delegations is the
distinct but related issue of executive discretion as to whether to
enforce a law against those who violate it."' A full treatment of the
complicated issues surrounding the Executive's autonomy in law
execution and interpretation, such as the authority to interpret the
Constitution and the related issues of executive refusal to follow and
refusal to enforce laws it believes unconstitutional, is beyond the
scope of this Article."' At a minimum, however, the interplay of
156. As the Court has repeatedly stated, it is "'constitutionally sufficient if Congress
clearly delineates the general policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the
boundaries of this delegated authority."' Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372-73
(1989) (quoting Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946)).
157. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) ("Finally, we recognize that
an agency's refusal to institute proceedings shares to some extent the characteristics of the
decision of a prosecutor in the Executive Branch not to indict-a decision which has long
been regarded as the special province of the Executive Branch, inasmuch as it is the
Executive who is charged by the Constitution to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed."') (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
158. There is a thick literature in this vein. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook,
Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905 (1989-90); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial
Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 43
(1993); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous
Executive Branch Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 81 (1993); Michael Stokes Paulsen,
The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L. 217
(1994); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Executive's Duty to Disregard Unconstitutional
Laws, 96 GEO. L.J. 1613 (2008) (arguing that the Take Care Clause not only allows but
requires the President to refuse to enforce or to ignore laws he deems unconstitutional);
Michael Rosenfeld, Executive Autonomy, Judicial Authority and the Rule of Law:
Reflections on Constitutional Interpretation and the Separation of Powers, 15 CARDOZO L.
REV. 137 (1993); David A. Strauss, Presidential Interpretation of the Constitution, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 43 (1993).
Although a treatment of these issues is beyond this Article's scope, the Executive's refusal
to enforce a statutory scheme to achieve policy goals it cannot achieve through legislative
change can be problematic. The refusal undermines the legislative bargain struck in the
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waiver delegations with executive enforcement discretion and the
prosecutorial power to grant immunity is important to understanding
the role waiver delegations play in the context of negative lawmaking
delegations.
The recently decided Ninth Circuit case of In re National Security
Agency Telecommunications Records Litigation is illustrative'59 After
plaintiffs filed several lawsuits against private telecommunications
companies who allegedly participated in a warrantless eavesdropping
program run by the National Security Agency, Congress enacted
legislation that provided retroactive immunity to the companies.'o
Amending the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"), the
law grants immunity to private telecommunications companies from
any civil action in federal or state court based on the companies'
"assistance to an element of the intelligence community."16' The
Attorney General triggers immunity by certifying the existence of one
or more of five conditions.162 The plaintiffs challenged the
constitutionality of the immunity provision on several grounds,
including that it violated bicameralism and presentment because it
non-enforced statute, which, one assumes, the Congress that passed it and the President
who signed it, believed would be enforced. For example, the Obama Administration's
enforcement of the immigration laws has been viewed by some states as overly lax,
bordering on a "federal polic[y] of nonenforcement." See Arizona v. United States, 132 S.
Ct. 2492, 2519 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Moreover, because the Development, Relief, and
Education for Alien Minors ("DREAM") Act has continued to stall in Congress, the
Obama Administration unilaterally changed its immigration enforcement policy to mirror
the DREAM Act's effect. See Janet Napolitano, Memorandum, Secretary of Homeland
Security Janet Napolitano, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with respect to Individuals
Who Came to the United States as Children (Jun. 15, 2012, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/
assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf.
In so doing, Secretary Napolitano made clear that only "Congress, acting through its
legislative authority" can confer "substantive right[s], immigration status, or a pathway to
citizenship," but that the Executive could "set forth policy for the exercise of discretion
within the framework of the existing law." Id. This statement belies the fact, however,
that Secretary Napolitano's directive negates the legal force or effect of, and thus
undermines the policies embodied in, the immigration laws previously enacted by
Congress through its legislative authority. See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2521 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). The policy change might be for the better, and it might indeed be the right
thing to do, but the change stands in stark contrast to Congress's failure to change existing
law.
159. 671 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2011).
160. Id. at 890.
161. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance (FISA) Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008
§ 802(a), Pub. L. No. 100-261, 122 Stat. 2435 (2008) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1885a).
162. They include Attorney General certification that the assistance was provided
pursuant to a FISA Court order, a national security letter, an Attorney General directive,
presidential authorization, or that no assistance was provided. Id.
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allowed the Attorney General to "effectively amend[] or negate[]
existing law.""' They unsuccessfully argued that the provision was
similar to the LIVA because it gave the Executive discretionary
authority to "partially repeal or preempt the law governing electronic
surveillance."'6
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that under the immunity provision
the "Executive does not change or repeal legislatively enacted
law .... The law remains as it was when Congress approved it and
the President signed it."'6  Because "[u]nlike the line item veto, the
Attorney General's certification implements the law as written and
does not frustrate or change the law as enacted by Congress,"'6 the
Attorney General's exercise of discretion was not an unconstitutional
partial repeal or amendment of statutory text.
The Ninth Circuit correctly pointed out that the "Attorney
General's certification implements the law as written." When the
Attorney General certifies the existence of one or more statutory
conditions, the immunity kicks in, and the FISA amendment is
implemented as written.'1 What the court failed to note was that this
was equally so when the President cancelled line items under the
LIVA. When the President cancelled the two line items at issue in
Clinton, he was implementing the LIVA. And by reading the LIVA
cancellation authority into the subsequently enacted spending bills-a
plausible reading given Congress's failure to exempt the spending
bills from the LIVA cancellation provision6'-the President was also
implementing the spending bills as written.
The Ninth Circuit's more important analysis was that "a
discretionary decision by the Attorney General that invokes a
defense or immunity hardly represents an impermissible statutory
163. In Re Nat'I Sec. Agency Telecommc'ns Records Litig., 671 F.3d 881, 894 (9th Cir.
2011).
164. Id.
165. Id., 671 F.3d at 894.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See Prakash, supra note 25 at 7 n.30 ("[Tihe President could use the Act to
'interpret' a subsequently enacted statute as sanctioning cancellations of certain
provisions, unless that statute provided otherwise. In this way, the Act was a rule of
construction in that it colored how to construe future acts of Congress.") Prakash's
argument is another way of saying that the LIVA creates a new default rule for spending
bills, through which the President has five days to cancel provisions of a statute he has
signed into law, unless the law expressly says that the default rule does not apply. See
infra Part IV.A (criticizing this view as inconsistent with the constitutional text and
structure governing lawmaking).
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repeal."'69  Relying on a law professors' amicus brief,170 the court
noted that "[i]t is not uncommon for executive officials to have
authority to trigger a defense or immunity for a third party."'71
Because "[ajn executive grant of immunity or waiver of claim has
never been recognized as a form of legislative repeal," the statute did
not violate Article I, Section 7.172 The amicus brief identified
numerous statutory examples of executive waiver conditioned upon
identification of certain circumstances."'7  The Ninth Circuit, citing
this portion of the amicus brief, considered this evidence that the
"United States Code is dotted with statutes authorizing comparable
executive authority.",7 4
The fact that other statutory examples of a similar type of power
exist does not establish that they are constitutional."' And although a
long tradition of granting similar authority to the Executive would not
be dispositive, it would be relevant to establishing that the practice is
at least historically acceptable, if not constitutional. The vast majority
of the listed examples, moreover, dealt with areas in which the
Executive has traditionally exercised independent constitutional
authority, such as foreign affairs, immigration, and law enforcement.
Because FISA-and the warrantless wiretapping program upon
169. In re Nat'1 Sec. Agency, 671 F.3d at 895.
170. Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Appellees and Affirmance at
1, In re Nat'1 Sec. Agency, 671 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2011) (Nos. 09-16676, 09-16677, 09-
16679, 09-16682, 09-16683, 09-16684, 09-16685, 09-16686, 09-16687, 09-16688, 09-16690,
09-16691, 09-16692, 09-16693, 09-16694, 09-16696, 09-16697. 09-16698, 09-16700, 09-
16701, 09-16702, 09-16704, 09-16706, 09-16707, 09-16708, 09-16709, 09-16710, 09-16712,
09-16713, 09-16717, 09-16719, 09-16720, 09-16723) ("Whether Congress should have
granted this immunity, amici believe Congress possesses the constitutional power to do
so."). Counsel of record for the amici law professors was Howard Wasserman of Florida
International University; the other law professors on the brief were Ed Brunet, Steven G.
Calabresi, Donald L. Doernberg, Richard D. Freer, Lumen N. Mulligan, Stephen B.
Presser, Robert J. Pushaw, Ronald D. Rotunda, Michael E. Solimine, and Steven D.
Smith. Id.
171. In re Nat'l Sec. Agency, 671 F.3d at 895 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (2006), which
allows executive officials to grant immunity from the fruits of compelled testimony in
criminal prosecutions and 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2) (2006), which allows the government to
trigger immunity by certifying that a defendant is acting within the scope of federal
employment).
172. In re Nat'1 Sec. Agency, 671 F.3d at 895
173. Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Appellees and Affirmance,
supra note 170, at Appendix A (listing over 50 statutory provisions).
174. In re Nat'l Sec. Agency, 671 F.3d at 895.
175. Cf Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 546-47 (1969) ("That an unconstitutional
action has been taken before surely does not render that same action any less
unconstitutional at a later date.").
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which the lawsuits were based-dealt with national security, the
Executive's traditional power in that area bolsters the argument that
this type of delegation to the Executive is constitutional."'
Granting private parties an additional statutory defense based
upon executive discretion is functionally similar to the executive
discretion not to enforce a law or not to indict-the latter having long
been considered within the sole unreviewable prerogative of the
Executive under the Take Care Clause."' One might extrapolate
from this functional similarity the notion that the Obama
Administration's waivers, whether authorized by the text of the ACA
or not, are constitutional because exempting private parties from a
requirement of the Act is functionally no different than declining to
enforce that requirement against them."'
This broader issue was not discussed in the In re National
Security Agency case. But the case demonstrates that delegations
which grant the Executive discretionary authority to trigger a
statutory defense or immunity mirror the negative effect upon
statutory text held unconstitutional in Clinton. While the negation of
other statutory text also involves the execution of statutory text
granting the discretionary authority to the Executive, this is a
difference in degree and not kind. Executing the LIVA permanently
negated the two line items cancelled, whereas executing the FISA
amendments only negates the text of the laws under which the now-
immune companies would have been liable. As applied to those
companies, the waived laws no longer have legal force or effect.
Although this Article contends that many waiver delegations
unconstitutionally allow the Executive to undo legislative
compromise outside the costly Article I, Section 7 bargaining process,
there is stronger support for such delegations in laws governing the
actions of individuals and private entities, rather than the functioning
of the government. Where the waiver delegation only allows waiver
of laws the enforcement of which would be within the unreviewable
prerogative of the Executive, such delegations are less problematic
despite their negative effect. Assuming the Ninth Circuit is correct
176. See Travis H. Mallen, Rediscovering the Nondelegation Doctrine Through A
Unified Separation of Powers Theory, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 419, 431 (2005) ("The
President's conduct, then, is not defined solely by Congress's power to delegate, but the
combination of the President's independent authority and Congress's delegation power.").
177. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985).
178. The history of the Take Care Clause undermines such a view, however, because
self-delegation of waiver authority is similar to the long-rejected dispensation prerogative.
See infra Part IV.B.
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about the relevant history, then the immunity provision at issue in In
re National Security Agency may be constitutional. Moreover,
because Congress decided that specific laws should not apply to
companies which met the specified criteria, it is less likely that
allowing the Executive to determine the existence of those criteria
would negate any underlying compromise in the negated text.
B. Amendment
May Congress grant the Executive Branch discretionary
authority to amend statutory text with new text never subjected to the
constitutional requirements of bicameralism and presentment?
Because of the Court's prior pronouncement that "amendment and
repeal of statutes, no less than enactment, must conform with
Art[icle] I," the answer should be no.' Two post-Clinton decisions in
the Federal Circuit suggest otherwise.
1. The Vaccine Injury Table Puzzle
The first case' involved a challenge to a provision in the
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986."' The Act contained
an "Initial Table" delineating allowable compensation to claimants
for vaccine-related injuries or death.'" Congress also delegated to the
Secretary of Health and Human Services the authority to "modify"
the Initial Table.83
The Secretary, using the modification authority, created a
"Modified Table,"'" deleting, among other things, various injuries
related to the diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis ("DPT") vaccine. The
Modified Table applied to all petitions for compensation filed on or
after its effective date.'" Plaintiffs, parents of a child who suffered
injuries after receiving the DPT vaccine, filed a claim under the Act
179. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954 (1983).
180. Terran ex rel. Terran v. Sec'y of Health & Human Services, 195 F.3d 1302 (Fed.
Cir. 1999).
181. National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat.
3755 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to 34 (2006)).
182. Id. § 300aa-14(a).
183. Id. § 300aa-14(c)(1). "A modification of the Vaccine Injury Table... may add
to, or delete from, the list of injuries, disabilities, illnesses, conditions, and deaths for
which compensation may be provided or may change the time periods for the first
symptom or manifestation of the onset or the significant aggravation of any such injury,
disability, illness, condition, or death." Id. § 300aa-14(c)(3).
184. Terran, 195 F.3d at 1302.
185. National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, § 300aa-14(c)(4).
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after the effective date of the Modified Table. Because the child's
injuries would have been compensable under the Initial Table, but
were not under the Modified Table, plaintiffs challenged the
modification, relying on Clinton and Article I, Section 7, as well as
nondelegation doctrine.
Although the Secretary's actions did not comport with
bicameralism and presentment, the Federal Circuit reasoned that the
modification did not "amend" or "repeal" any portion of the Act
because the Secretary was merely "promulgat[ing] new regulations as
contemplated in the Act."087 The court explained:
Although we acknowledge that the statutory
language in section 300aa-14(c) refers to the
Secretary's ability "to modify" and "to amend" the
Vaccine Injury Table, 42 U.S.C., § 300aa-14(c)(1), (2)
(1994), a closer reading of that section makes clear
that when the Secretary acts pursuant to section
300aa-14(c), she does not change in any way the
original injury table found in section 300aa-14(a), but
rather promulgates an entirely new vaccine injury
table. This new table applies only prospectively. The
Initial Table remains codified and unaltered, and
continues to apply to all petitions filed before the
revision. Therefore, the Initial Table is not
amended.'"
The court also relied on Clinton's attempt to distinguish the
Rules Enabling Act from the LIVA. The Vaccine Act's negative
lawmaking delegation was like a "sunset provision" because Congress
"clearly intended that the Initial Table would cease to apply to newly
filed petitions when the Secretary promulgated a revised injury
table."a9  Quoting Clinton, the court stated that: "the Supreme
Court's power to 'repeal' laws by promulgating rules of procedure for
the lower federal courts does not run afoul of the Presentment Clause
because 'Congress itself made the decision to repeal prior rules upon
the occurrence of a particular event-here, the promulgation of
186. Terran, 195 F.3d at 1312.
187. Id.
188. Terran, 195 F.3d at 1312.
189. Id.
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procedural rules by this Court."'" Reasoning that the Rules Enabling
Act was thus functionally similar to the Vaccine Act, the court held
that the amendment of the Vaccine Injury Table did not violate
Article I, Section 7, since "Congress itself decided to render the
Initial Table ineffective upon the Secretary's action."'
Dissenting, Judge Plager reiterated the plaintiffs' argument that
the injured child "would be entitled to an award under the terms of
the Congressionally-enacted table, but that under the table as
amended by the Secretary she is not so entitled."'" He contended
that it made little sense to say that the Act did not authorize an
amendment because it merely authorized creation of a new table that
superseded the old table.' Indeed, congressional changes to law
"almost invariably" apply prospectively, so the majority's reasoning
would mean Congress "does not 'amend' a statute when it makes
changes in existing legislation and leaves the earlier enactment
unrepealed-only in the rare case of total repeal with retroactivity is
the change an 'amendment.""'94
Judge Plager's argument is persuasive. Making the legal force or
effect of statutory text contingent upon an agent's discretionary
modification of that text, moreover, is nothing like a sunset provision.
Rather, sunset provisions automatically negate the legal force or
effect of a statute upon the occurrence of an external condition
(usually a specified date), and do not involve legislative-type
discretion.' And the fact that Congress "clearly intended" that the
text of spending bills would "cease to apply" if the President made
the required LIVA determinations was insufficient to sustain the
190. Id. at 1313.
191. Id. The court also swiftly disposed of the nondelegation challenge, finding a
sufficiently intelligible principle to sustain the delegation. See Terran, 195 F.3d at 1314-15
(finding that, among other things, the initial table served as an intelligible principle and
that the statute required the new table to be in the same format as the original, a further
intelligible restraint on the exercise of discretion). The court did, however, note that "the
Secretary could in theory delete all the entries in the table or, conversely, sweep in all
possible illnesses or conditions," but it found that because of the consultation
requirements and notice-and-comment requirements such discretion was not unbounded.
Id.
192. Id. at 1318. (Plager, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 1319-20.
194. Id. at 1320.
195. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 599 (2006) ("This chapter shall cease to be effective five
years after the date of the enactment of the Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of
1994...
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statute; nor did Clinton indicate that the line-item veto was like a
sunset provision.
The Federal Circuit also relied on the three factors Clinton used
to distinguish the Tariff Act upheld in Field v. Clark from the LIVA.
First, the negative power in the Vaccine Act was exercised under
different conditions than when the legislation was enacted. 6 Second,
while the LIVA did little to cabin the President's discretion, the Tariff
Act's delegation was more circumscribed. Similarly, the Vaccine Act
also constrained the Secretary's discretion, because it provided for
various procedural requirements." Third, the Secretary was fulfilling
congressional policy in amending the Vaccine Table, just as the
President was when he suspended import duty exemptions under the
Tariff Act, whereas under the LIVA he was purportedly contravening
congressional policy.'
These distinctions are unpersuasive. The Supreme Court has
never explained why changed circumstances after enactment matter
for purposes of Article I, Section 7. And, though the Secretary
modified the Initial Table several years after the Vaccine Act went
through bicameralism and presentment, there was nothing in the Act
temporally limiting her power to do so.'" Moreover, while Clinton
did rely on the limited discretion the President had under the tariff
statutes as compared to under the LIVA,2" the Secretary's discretion
was not nearly so limited under the Vaccine Act.20' Finally, when the
Secretary promulgated the Modified Table, she negated the policy
embodied in the Initial Table while simultaneously executing the
policy embodied in the provision granting the modification authority.
Why was the general policy of the LIVA insufficient to allow override
of whatever policies were embodied in the cancelled line items, while
the general policy of compensating vaccine injuries was sufficient to
196. Terran, 195 F.3d at 1313.
197. These included notice and comment, petition by any person, and consultation
with experts. Id. at 1314.
198. Id.
199. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14 (c) (2006).
200. Clinton thought it was relevant that, under the tariff statutes, the negative power
was mandatory upon finding certain conditions. See supra note 118 and accompanying
text.
201. See Terran, 195 F.3d at 1314-15 (noting that, despite some guideposts for the
Secretary's exercise of discretion, "the Secretary could in theory delete all the entries in
the table or, conversely, sweep in all possible illnesses or conditions").
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override whatever policies were embodied in the Initial Table?20
This the Federal Circuit never explained.
As the Federal Circuit's analysis here shows, courts relying on
the loose distinctions of Clinton can uphold amendment delegations,
even though the amendment of statutory text ordinarily requires
bicameralism and presentment. The delegation need only make the
negative effect on existing statutory text automatic upon the
promulgation of different text by the Executive.
2. The Dolphin Safe Tuna Puzzle
The second case involving amendment delegation203 evaluated
the International Dolphin Conservation Program Act ("IDCPA").
The IDCPA implemented an executive agreement seeking to reduce
dolphin fatalities caused by the purse seine method of tuna fishing
and brought supermarkets nationwide the now-defunct "Dolphin
Safe Tuna" label.204 The Act further delegated rulemaking authority
to implement the Act to the Secretary of Commercewi but specified
that certain requirements be included in the implementing
regulations; among these was a requirement that backdown
(finishing) of the purse seine method of fishing be completed thirty
minutes before sundown.2 6 Nevertheless, the Secretary's interim-final
rule required completion thirty minutes after sundown.20 7
202. One might contend that both the Initial Table and Modified Table embodied the
same policy: compensating victims of injuries linked to vaccines. What this argument fails
to account for, however, is the nature of the Article I, Section 7 lawmaking process. That
process inevitably involves myriad compromises on the way to producing an enacted text.
See infra Part IV.C. In Terran, whatever the reason for the compromises involved in
enacting the Initial Table, those compromises resulted in a determination that DPT-
related injuries were compensable. When the Secretary chose to delete that text from the
Modified Table, she overrode the policy compromise that put DPT in the Initial Table,
thereby replacing a congressional policy decision with her own.
203. Defenders of Wildlife v. Hogarth (Hogarth 1), 330 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
204. International Dolphin Conservation Program Act, Pub. L. No. 105-42, 111 Stat.
1122 (1997).
205. 16 U.S.C. § 1413 (2006).
206. Id. § 1413(a)(2)(B)(v) (requiring that regulations ensure "that the backdown
procedure... is completed... no later than 30 minutes before sundown") (emphasis
added).
207. Taking of Marine Mammals Incidental to Commercial Fishing Operations: Tuna
Purse Seine Vessels in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP), 50 C.F.R. §
216.24(c)(6)(iii) (2012), 65 Fed. Reg. 30, 51 (Jan. 3, 2000) ("the backdown procedure must
be completed no later than one-half hour after sundown") (emphasis added).
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The Defenders of Wildlife challenged the rule as plainly contrary
to the IDCPA's text.208 The Federal Circuit sustained the rule,
notwithstanding its clear conflict with the statutory text, relying on an
amendment delegation within the IDCPA that allowed "adjustments"
to statutory requirements pertaining to "fishing practices."209 The
court upheld the change as a permissible alteration of a "fishing
practice" under the IDCPA's delegation of modification authority.210
Dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc, Judge Gajarsa,
joined by Judge Newman, argued that the panel opinion "permits the
Secretary of Commerce to trump a duly enacted statute with a
regulation."211 Although "the supremacy of administrative over
legislative authority is a concept foreign to our structure of
government," the panel opinion, by sanctioning abrogation of
statutory text without bicameralism and presentment, was allowing an
agency to override Congress.2 12 "A regulation eviscerating the legal
force of the backdown procedures in [the Act] is no less an
amendment to the IDCPA than the striking of clauses found
unconstitutional in Clinton.2" Thus, as with the LIVA, a provision of
"Law" no longer had legal force or effect because of unilateral
*214
executive action.
Judge Gajarsa's dissent properly notes the tension the panel
opinion has with Clinton. Allowing the Secretary to abrogate express
statutory requirements via administrative rulemaking is contrary to
the language "amendment and repeal of statutes, no less than
enactment, must conform with Art. I,""21 as well as to the Court's
statement that it is unconstitutional to give the Executive "the
unilateral power to change the text of duly enacted statutes."' 6 The
208. Hogarth 1, 330 F.3d at 1363.
209. 16 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(2)(C). It authorized the Secretary of Commerce to "make
such adjustments as may be appropriate to requirements of subparagraph (B) that pertain
to fishing gear, vessel equipment, and fishing practices to the extent the adjustments are
consistent with the International Dolphin Conservation Program." Id.
210. Hogarth 1. 330 F.3d at 1367 n.5.
211. Defenders of Wildlife v. Hogarth (Hogarth II), 344 F.3d 1333, 1334 (2003)
(Gajarsa, J., with Newman, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
212. Id. (citing Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998)).
213. Id. at 1335.
214. Id. ("Much as Congress is forbidden to amend the Constitution with ordinary
legislation, an executive agency may not amend legislation with regulation. This is the
import of Article I, § 7 and Clinton.").
215. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954 (1983).
216. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 447.
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regulation requiring backdown completion thirty minutes after
sundown deprived the statutory text requiring completion thirty
minutes before sundown of legal force or effect.
Allowing executive agents to supersede duly enacted statutory
text with their own new text is functional amendment without
bicameralism and presentment. In the vaccine case, this functional
amendment meant that under congressional policy embodied in the
Initial Table the child's injuries were compensable, but under
executive policy embodied in the Modified Table her injuries were
not. And in Hogarth, this functional amendment replaced a
congressionally enacted rule protecting dolphins from purse seine
tuna fishing with an executively promulgated rule that was less
dolphin protective. Such executive override of congressional policy
was at the heart of Clinton's rationale for proscribing unilateral
executive amendment of statutory text.
IV. Constitutional Limitations on Negative Lawmaking
Delegations
Some of the most prominent constitutional law scholars have
commented favorably on the Court's decision to strike down the
LIVA. " Even before the Court did so, many commentators were
already predicting the Act's demise, relying on a variety of
constitutional arguments, from nondelegation doctrine, the Take
Care Clause, and, most prominently, Article I, Section 7, which of
course ultimately became the rationale the Court adopted.
Even some detractors of the Court's Article I, Section 7 analysis
recognized that the decision was correct to invalidate the item veto
provision, and likely avoided other rationales (such as the
nondelegation doctrine) out of necessity, rather than analytical rigor.
A decision resurrecting nondelegation doctrine as a viable, judicially
enforceable constraint on lawmaking delegations, for example, might
have threatened the very foundations of the administrative state.
And Justice Stevens, who authored Clinton, also penned Chevron, a
decision that established the now-familiar administrative law regime
of deference to administrative agency lawmaking, in which
ambiguities or gaps in a statute are assumed to be implicit
congressional delegations of lawmaking power to the agency charged
with administering the statute. Invoking nondelegation doctrine to
constrain the negative lawmaking delegation in the LIVA would have
217. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 22.
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been difficult to square with a framework that largely defers to both
explicit and implicit congressional delegations of lawmaking authority
to the Executive. Perhaps Clinton thus rested implicitly on a view
that the LIVA delegated a unique type of lawmaking authority.
But as the previous Part demonstrates, if the unique nature of
the effect the delegated power in the LIVA had on statutory text was
the basis for the decision, then many other lawmaking delegations
should be unconstitutional, because the LIVA was not unique in its
delegation of negative lawmaking authority to the Executive. This
Part, relying on constitutional text, structure, and history, draws upon
this insight and analyzes negative lawmaking delegations more
comprehensively.
First, the generality of the Vesting Clauses, and the resulting
indeterminacy of the nondelegation doctrine, means that the
Constitution's tripartite structural allocation of power does not bar
the delegation of negative lawmaking power to the Executive.21
Second, the Take Care Clause, understood in its historical context,
contains a principle independent from the Vesting Clauses that
constrains negative lawmaking delegations.
Third, contrary to the generality of the Vesting Clauses, Article
I, Section 7 speaks at a level of fine-grained specificity. In so doing, it
prescribes the sine qua non for making "Law" under the Constitution,
and unilateral executive discretion should not suffice to override a
prior bargain made by constitutionally delineated actors. The Article
I, Section 7 test of Clinton, properly understood and further refined,
provides the principal constraint on delegations of negative
lawmaking power to the Executive. The structural purposes of
bicameralism and presentment are best served by limiting such
delegations.
A. Nondelegation Doctrine: The Vesting Clauses and Generality
Problems
Given the weakness of the nondelegation doctrine as a constraint
on congressional delegation of broad legislative-type discretion to
non-legislative actors, most commentators have not looked to it as a
limitation on negative lawmaking delegations. Indeed, some have
218. See supra Part LA (explaining nondelegation doctrine and its constitutional
dimension); cf. Manning, supra note 35, at 2017-21 (contending that the generality of the
Vesting Clauses makes deriving any specific constitutional rule from them problematic).
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argued nondelegation doctrine should be rejected entirely. 219 Such
commentators believe delegation is not only appropriate, but also
entirely consistent with the constitutional text and structure, and that
therefore even negative lawmaking delegations are constitutional.22 0
Justice Breyer's dissent in Clinton reflects a similar understanding.2 21
Those who share these views consider executive lawmaking, at least
when done pursuant to statutory delegation, to be a key functional
necessity in the administrative state, constitutional because the
Executive, in making law, is merely executing the statute Congress
enacted, not legislating.
Professor Prakash, taking a similar though somewhat distinct
view, looks beyond the Vesting Clauses222 and relies heavily on the
Necessary and Proper Clausem2  to infer from the constitutional text
and structure that lawmaking delegations of all types are
constitutional.224 And despite his view that delegated executive
lawmaking is constitutional, he further argues that the LIVA "itself
delegated nothing;" instead, the Act was merely a "rule of
construction."2m Because the President could not cancel spending
provisions until Congress passed a subsequent statute subject to the
LIVA, the Act allowed the President to construe later-enacted
statutes as themselves containing the item veto power, thereby giving
219. E.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to
Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2165 (arguing "nondelegation
doctrine... should be rejected"); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1721 (2002) ("In this essay, we argue
that there is no such nondelegation doctrine: A statutory grant of authority to the
executive branch or other agents never effects a delegation of legislative power.").
220. See, e.g., Prakash, supra note 25, at 4 (arguing negative lawmaking delegations
such as the LIVA, "like generic lawmaking delegations, can be constitutional").
221. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 481-90 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing how the LIVA was
properly understood as allowing the President to "execute" the law and how it was not an
impermissible delegation of "legislative power").
222. The Legislative Vesting Clause provides: "All legislative Powers herein granted
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States.. . ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. The
Executive Vesting Clause provides: "The executive power shall be vested in a President of
the United States of America." Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. The Judicial Vesting Clause provides:
"The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." Id. art.
III, § 1.
223. Congress shall have the power to "make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by
this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof." Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
224. See Prakash, supra note 25, at 11-16.
225. See id. at 7 n.30.
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the President the authority to cancel their provisions. Each
subsequent statute, unless exempted from the LIVA by Congress,
thus contained the item veto power; when the President exercised
that power, he was simply "executing" the subsequent acts, which was
no different than implementing spending bills in other manners, such
as by spending specified amounts on specific projects.2 2 6
From this conclusion, Professor Prakash argues that the key
question should have been whether the LIVA impermissibly shifted
"the balance of power toward the President," which he contends it
did not, since Congress could exempt future bills from the scope of
the President's item veto authority.27  This Article contends
otherwise. Although it is true that Congress may exempt any future
bill from the scope of a prior bill's delegated authority, those future
bills could also be vetoed in their entirety by a President who enjoys
the newfound power to cancel line items in federal spending bills,
thus impermissibly shifting power to the President by forcing
Congress to pass those future bills by supermajority, a requirement
the Constitution ordinarily only provides for the extraordinary. 28 To
restore the ordinary constitutional allocation of power, Congress
would have to overcome the highest of constitutional hurdles. Given
the already large shift in power to the Executive created by the
regime of Chevron deference, additional shifts in the same direction
should be viewed with increased concern.229
226. Justice Breyer's dissent in Clinton reflects a similar view, except that he viewed
the cancellation as executing the LIVA, not the budget acts which contained the cancelled
spending provisions. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
227. See Prakash,supra note 25, at 47-48.
228. The original Constitution expressly specifies a supermajority voting requirement
in only five situations: when either house expels a member, U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5, cl. 2;
when the Senate convicts a President or other high officer on impeachment charges, id. §
3, cl. 6; when the Senate ratifies a treaty, id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; when Congress proposes a
constitutional amendment to the states, id. art. V; and when Congress overturns a
presidential veto, id. art. 1, § 7, cl. 2. See Dan T. Coenen, The Originalist Case Against
Congressional Supermajority Voting Rules, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 1091, 1105-49 (2012)
(discussing the negative inference that can be drawn from the Constitution's express
specification of supermajority voting requirements). Political scientists have also shown
that bicameralism itself is roughly equivalent to a supermajority requirement. See John F.
Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1287, 1314 (2010) (citing JAMES
M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 233-48 (1962)). A supermajority
requirement in both houses is thus a far more difficult hurdle than a one-house
supermajority requirement.
229. See Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 452, 525 (1989).
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In addition, if Congress delegates a broad and unprecedented
power to the Executive, as it did in the LIVA, then the more likely
the President would be to veto any attempt to undermine the
newfound power. This state of affairs would give the President a
significant bargaining chip in the legislative process, one not provided
for in the constitutional text and inconsistent with its structure. It
would allow the President to extract concessions from Congress
otherwise beyond reach.
Nevertheless, despite this Article's contrary view of the LIVA's
balance of power pathologies, if the Court is right to conclude that
positive lawmaking delegations are constitutional so long as they
provide an intelligible principle, then perhaps negative lawmaking
delegations are too. If this is so, then one might counter that what
distinguishes negative from positive lawmaking delegations, at least
under the Vesting Clauses (which undergird nondelegation doctrine's
intelligible principle requirement), is that negating the legal force or
effect of statutory text seems more like an exercise of "legislative"
power, while adding on to or filling in imprecise or broad statutory
text is merely incidental to law execution.
At least two considerations undermine this argument. First, as a
functional matter, the distinction between enacting a rule with the
same legal force or effect as a statute, and negating a statutory
provision's legal force or effect, is tenuous. Exercises of both positive
lawmaking power and negative lawmaking power by the Executive
are exercises of power pursuant to a statutory delegation enacted by
Congress in the exercise of its enumerated powers under Article I,
Section 8 and the Necessary and Proper Clause.23 0 Both types of
230. The debate over the role of the Necessary and Proper Clause with respect to
lawmaking delegations is beyond the scope of this Article, but it is worth noting that
historical materials "reveal precious little about how the clause structures Congress's
horizontal relationship with the coordinate branches" and that "the bargain seems to have
been to identify Congress as the responsible actor but to leave matters concerning the
precise scope of the power to be worked out later." Manning, supra note 35, at 1989
(footnotes omitted).
Analysis of the scope of the power conferred on Congress by the Necessary and Proper
Clause generally comes in the familiar context of vertical relationships between the federal
government on one hand, and the states and the people on the other. That concern, for
example, was front and center in the Court's decision on whether Congress had the
constitutional power to enact the Affordable Care Act. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v.
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). But evaluating the Necessary and Proper Clause in this
context does little to illuminate the role of the Clause for the horizontal separation of
powers questions raised by negative lawmaking delegations. See William W. Van Alstyne,
The Role of Congress in Determining Incidental Powers of the President and of the Federal
Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect of the Sweeping Clause, 40 LAW &
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delegated lawmaking power affect the legal rights and duties of
individuals or the structure and functioning of the government. Both
shape and affect the content and scope of text that has the force or
effect of law.
Second, negative lawmaking delegations are often guided by
open-ended standards in statutes that are at least as intelligible as
those upheld in the positive lawmaking delegation context of agency
rulemaking. Thus, just as the exercise of delegated positive
lawmaking authority by the Executive may not exceed the limits set
forth in the statute and is theoretically subject to judicial review,2 so
too is the exercise of statutorily delegated negative lawmaking
authority.
For example, if President Clinton had not made the three
determinations required by the LIVA, a court could have determined
that he exceeded his delegated authority. Likewise, if Great Britain
had not imposed reciprocally unequal and unreasonable tariff duties
on the United States, thus making Great Britain's tariff policy the
same as when the statute was enacted, then judicial review would
have been available to challenge the President's suspension of trade
duty exemptions under the Tariff Act analyzed in Field v. Clark.
Indeed, because nondelegation doctrine requires that Congress
provide a standard for any lawmaking delegation, whether positive or
negative, the Executive's exercise of discretion under any lawmaking
delegation is theoretically subject to judicial review to ensure
compliance with that standard. Considered in this light, both types of
delegations are similar and operate under the same constraints;
characterizing one as executive power and the other as legislative
power provides no judicially administrable limitation on either type
of delegation. Because of the generality of their language2 and the
CONTEMP. PROBS. 102, 116 (1976) (noting that the Necessary and Proper Clause's
meaning for "the role of Congress and the amplification of executive power has been
much neglected"). On the overall scope of the power conferred by the Necessary and
Proper Clause, however, there is a rich academic debate. See generally, e.g., Gary Lawson
& Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional
Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267 (1993); Randy E. Barnett, The
Original Meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 183 (2004); J.
Randy Beck, The New Jurisprudence of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 2002 U. ILL. L.
REV. 581; Robert G. Natelson, The Agency Law Origins of the Necessary and Proper
Clause, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 243 (2004).
231. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953 n.16 (1983); see also Beermann, supra note 35,
at 99-106 (discussing the role of judicial review and the way in which statutes constrain
agency lawmaking).
232. See Manning, supra note 35, at 1986 (contending that the generality of the
Vesting Clauses means they may do little to resolve separation of powers issues).
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resultant difficulty in categorizing the nature of governmental
power,' the Vesting Clauses provide little clarity on the
constitutionality of negative lawmaking delegations.3 4 And due to
the Constitution's blending of many functions (which, like the
separation of powers, was a deliberate choice by the Framers),
categorizing powers under the Vesting Clauses may not only be
fruitless, but also of little practical value.235 In the administrative
state, the Executive now makes law (as does the Judiciary" 6); it also
then enforces the laws it writes and judges those who violate them.237
B. The Take Care Clause
The Take Care Clause238 generally has not been viewed as a
constraint on delegated executive lawmaking, even though the initial
233. Chief Justice Marshall made this point long ago when he stated:
The difference between the departments undoubtedly is, that the
legislature makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary construes
the law; but the maker of the law may commit something to the
discretion of the other departments, and the precise boundary of this
power is a subject of delicate and difficult inquiry, into which a Court
will not enter unnecessarily.
Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 46 (1825). Time has yet to reveal where
Chief Justice Marshall's "precise boundary" might be found. See, e.g., Lawson, supra note
42, at 1238-39 & n.45 (noting that "the Constitution does not tell us how to distinguish the
legislative, executive, and judicial powers from each other" and that the "problem of
distinguishing the three functions of government has long been, and continues to be, one
of the most intractable puzzles in constitutional law") (citations and quotations omitted);
M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers Law, 150 U.
PA. L. REV. 603, 604 (2001) ("The effort to identify and separate governmental powers
fails because, in the contested cases, there is no principled way to distinguish between the
relevant powers.").
234. Cf Manning, supra note 35, at 1959 ("Bereft of any express Separation of Powers
clause, formalists derive their position not from any identifiable provision of the
Constitution, but rather from the overall structure of the Vesting Clauses and other
clauses suggesting a purpose to separate powers.").
235. See Magill, supra note 233, at 605 ("Talk of balancing three branches exercising
three powers may be comfortable, but it is also tired, and more important, unhelpful and
in some ways incoherent.").
236. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006) (delegating to the Supreme Court the power to
"prescribe general rules of practice of procedure and rules of evidence" in federal district
courts and courts of appeals); see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-72
(1989) (evaluating a delegation of authority to create sentencing guidelines, which at the
time were binding on district courts, to the United States Sentencing Commission, a part
of the judicial branch).
237. See Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 151
(1991) (noting how many administrative agencies perform all three functions).
238. Recall that the President is to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
580 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 40:3
court challenge to the LIVA (brought by legislators who voted
against the Act) succeeded in the district court by relying on the
clause.23 9 This is so because, as a textual matter, the President is
"faithfully execut[ing]" the law delegating the negative power when
he invokes it to negate other laws.2" A brief exploration of the
history of the royal prerogatives of suspension and dispensation
shows, however, that the Take Care Clause was in part designed to
ensure such prerogatives were not exercised by the President, thereby
limiting his role as lawmaker. Understood against this historical
backdrop, negative lawmaking delegations raise serious concerns
because they are functionally similar to the royal prerogatives
wrested from the Crown by Parliament (and denied the President by
the Take Care Clause), and they share many of the same pathologies.
When so viewed, the Take Care Clause establishes a
constitutional default of law effectiveness: the President may not
suspend or dispense with laws independently. Some commentators,
however, argue the Take Care Clause goes no further-that is, it
applies only when Congress has not delegated a negative power.2 '
When Congress has delegated such a power, then negative lawmaking
delegations are no different than the positive lawmaking delegations
so commonly upheld. Nevertheless, the problematic history of the
Crown's abuse of the royal prerogatives counsels against dismissing
the clause completely, even where Congress has exercised its Article I
powers to delegate negative lawmaking authority to the Executive.
1. A Brief Sketch of the Historical Backdrop
In England, despite Parliament's theoretical legislative
supremacy, the Crown had independent negative lawmaking power
through the use of the royal prerogatives of suspension and
dispensation. The suspension prerogative allowed the Crown to
negate statutes, thereby abrogating the entire law or the portions with
239. Byrd v. Raines, 956 F. Supp. 25, 37 (D.D.C. 1997) ("Canceling, i.e., repealing,
parts of a law cannot be considered its faithful execution."), vacated, Raines v. Byrd, 521
U.S. 811 (1997); Robert C. Byrd, The Control of the Purse and the Line Item Veto Act, 35
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 297, 321 (1998) ("The Act, in short, turns the President's duty to 'take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed' on its head, allowing the President to
emasculate a law (or extinguish a portion of a law) that he has just approved.").
240. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 493-94 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(noting that the President, in exercising his item veto power under the LIVA, was
"execut[ing] a law in which Congress has specified its desire that the President have the
very authority he exercised").
241. See, e.g., Prakash, supra note 25, at 48-49.
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which the Crown disagreed.22 The dispensation prerogative allowed
the Crown to excuse the individuals granted a dispensation from the
duty of complying with the law, but it otherwise left the law intact.243
When constitutionmakers began the task of writing the blueprint
for the United States government, they "were closely acquainted with
English constitutional history" and therefore felt compelled to
enshrine "the hard won principle that the Executive did not possess
the authority to suspend a law."244 Accordingly, the Framers believed
"that a statute may be suspended only by the lawmaking authority,
and not by the Executive acting alone." 245 The Framers' familiarity
with the English Crown evading the positive lawmaking supremacy of
Parliament through suspension and dispensation frames Article II,
Section 3's command that the President "shall take care that the Laws
be faithfully executed," a command honoring the English struggle to
transfer negative lawmaking power from the Crown to the
Legislature.246
In this context, the requirement of faithful execution represents
an affirmative constitutional command prohibiting unilateral exercise
of negative lawmaking power by the Executive.247 Cancellation
242. Christopher N. May, Presidential Defiance of "Unconstitutional" Laws: Reviving
the Royal Prerogative, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 865, 870 & n.12 (1994).
243. Id.
244. Id. at 872.
245. Id. at 873.
246. Id. ("[Tlhe clause acquires a richer and more specific meaning if we view it
against the historical backdrop with which the Framers were familiar-the four hundred
year struggle of the English people to limit the king's prerogative and achieve a
government under law rather than royal fiat."). William Blackstone explained the
outcome of the struggle between king and Parliament on the issue of negative lawmaking
authority:
An act of parliament... is the exercise of the highest authority that
this kingdom acknowledges upon earth.... And it cannot be altered,
amended, dispensed with, suspended, or repealed, but in the same
forms, and by the same authority of parliament.... [I]t is declared that
the suspending or dispensing with laws by regal authority, without
consent of parliament, is illegal.
I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *186-87
247. See, e.g., William B. Gwyn, The Indeterminacy of the Separation of Powers and
the Federal Courts, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 474, 491 n.82 (1989); Robert J. Reinstein, An
Early View of Executive Powers and Privilege: The Trial of Smith and Ogden, 2 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 309, 320-21 n.50 (1975); Peter M. Shane, Independent Policymaking and
Presidential Power: A Constitutional Analysis, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 596, 613 (1989)
("The President's duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed was an obligation,
not a source of power. It incorporated into the Constitution the English prohibition on the
executive suspension of statutes."); Charles Tiefer, The Constitutionality of Independent
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delegations, as in the LIVA, allow the President to abrogate statutory
text without congressional vote in seeming contradiction of the
President's duty to faithfully execute the law.
2. Take Care Clause as Constitutional Default Rule
Implicit in the Take Care Clause is a principle that limits the
extent to which Congress may delegate negative lawmaking power to
the Executive. Although Congress may delegate limited negative
lawmaking power to the Executive, the Take Care Clause imposes a
limitation on such delegations, even greater than the limitations
imposed on positive lawmaking delegations by the Vesting Clauses
and the intelligible principle requirement of the nondelegation
doctrine. Congress may not give the President the power to prevent
duly enacted statutes from being executed at all, thereby empowering
him to violate the duty imposed by the Take Care Clause.
To see why this is so, note the functional similarity of negative
lawmaking delegations to the Crown's suspension and dispensation
prerogatives. Cancellation resembles suspension, while waiver
functions similarly to dispensation. The only difference is that
cancellation and waiver have Congress's imprimatur-an important
difference to be sure, but not a determinative one.2 48  Although
Congress may delegate some form of negative lawmaking power to
the Executive, it may not do so in ways that recreate functional
equivalents to the royal prerogatives denied the President by the
Take Care Clause.
This principle means that when Congress delegates cancellation
authority, as it did in the LIVA, that delegation raises concerns
because it allows the President to suspend the legal force or effect of
the statutory text he cancels, a power resembling the forbidden
Officers as Checks on Abuses of Executive Power, 63 B.U. L. REV. 59, 90 & n.151 (1983).
Other commentators have been more circumspect in evaluating the import of the Take
Care Clause as a limitation on presidential power. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi &
Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541,
583-84 (1994) ("The Take Care Clause perhaps limits and defines the Executive Power
Clause's grant of executive power by making it clear that the President has no royal
prerogative to suspend statutes."); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and
the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10 (1994) ("It may be true that the Take Care
Clause is a duty at least as much as it is a power; but the duty is the President's, and as
with any duty, it implies certain powers.").
248. Congressional authorization, while important, is not determinative because
cancellation and waiver delegations, like all negative lawmaking delegations, circumvent
bicameralism and presentment, thereby undermining the minority-protective function of
Article I, Section 7. See infra Part IV.C (analyzing the functions of bicameralism and
presentment).
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suspension prerogative. Though this power was limited to spending
bills and required three putative findings before it could be exercised,
those limitations did little to ameliorate the broader problem: after
the LIVA, all spending items were precatory until the President
declined to exercise his cancellation authority during the time in
which he was allowed to do so.249 Congress's legislative supremacy
vis-A-vis the President was thereby undermined, a result contrary to
the lessons of English history that the Framers understood when
drafting the U.S. Constitution and assigning "all legislative powers
herein granted" to Congress while mandating that the President "take
care that the laws be faithfully executed."
The Obama Administration's healthcare waivers likewise raise
Take Care Clause concerns. Because the ACA contains no express
delegation of authority to waive the minimum coverage provisions of
the Act,5 interpreting the Act to grant the Executive the power to do
so is in effect executive self-delegation of a dispensation power.251 It
would make little sense to embody the rejection of the suspension
and dispensation prerogatives in the Constitution only to allow
Congress to recreate their functional equivalents, subject only to
repeal through bicameralism and presentment, or, since the President
would likely veto any repeal attempt as a matter of course, through
passage by supermajority in both Houses. Nor would it make sense
to allow the Executive to read suspension and dispensation
delegations into statutes, even assuming textual ambiguity and a
strong conception of Chevron deference to executive interpretations
of statutes such as the ACA.252
Negative lawmaking by the Executive, particularly through
selective waivers granted only to some, and even when authorized by
congressional delegation in a statute, is also problematic because it
allows for favoritism and unequal application of the law. Much as the
Crown could reward allies by granting dispensations, thereby
relieving them from the burden of complying with generally
applicable laws, the Executive can reward the loyal, the favored, and
249. See supra Part II.B.4.
250. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
251. See Hamburger, supra note 16.
252. A reviewing court must defer to an agency's reasonable interpretation of
ambiguous provisions in a statute that the agency administers; textual ambiguity is treated
as implicit congressional delegation of lawmaking power to the agency. See Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-45 (1984). The Court has
limited Chevron deference to agency action taken pursuant to delegated lawmaking
authority. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-31 (2001).
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the powerful by granting waivers, while leaving the opposition, the
disenfranchised, and the undesired to flounder without such relief.
The risk of political favoritism, and the influence of interest groups in
the lawmaking process, is heightened when done solely in the
discretion of the Executive, rather than with the check the bicameral
legislative process provides.
Nevertheless, the Take Care Clause, even if viewed as an
independent constraint on delegation of negative lawmaking power to
the Executive, does not itself answer the question of how much
negative power Congress may delegate. When does a limited
delegation of waiver authority become a prohibited delegation of a
dispensation power? Perhaps it has to do with the scope of the
negative lawmaking power and the degree to which it is constrained
by express criteria. But this is little different than nondelegation
doctrine, and thus shares a similar problem of judicial
manageability."'
Nor does the Take Care Clause solve the puzzle of negative
lawmaking delegation generally. Indeed, because the Clause is
directed at the President, it is arguable whether it can properly be
viewed as a constraint on Congress's lawmaking power, and even if it
can be so viewed, whether that limitation should extend to
delegations to executive officers below the President.254 Nevertheless,
the Take Care Clause may help explain the Court's more stringent
scrutiny of the LIVA. Because the Take Care Clause was designed in
part as a limitation on suspension and dispensation, reading the
Clause as embodying a background principle limiting negative
lawmaking delegations is consistent with its historical backdrop.
Vague, open-ended negative lawmaking delegations, as in the LIVA,
functionally resemble the suspension prerogative and should
253. Because it is "'constitutionally sufficient if Congress clearly delineates the general
policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated
authority,"' there is little a reviewing court can do when considering a nondelegation
doctrine challenge to a statutory delegation of lawmaking power. Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 372-73 (1989) (quoting Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90,
105 (1946)); see infra Part L.A (discussing the theoretical limitation of nondelegation
doctrine). Nothing in the Supreme Court's nondelegation jurisprudence, and nothing in
the constitutional text and structure, can tell a reviewing court whether a "general policy"
is sufficiently "clear" or whether the "boundaries" of "delegated authority" go too far.
Accordingly, "[w]hile the acid test for impermissible delegation is thus an excessive
legislative grant of discretion, the Court has never been able to articulate a judicially
manageable standard for identifying how much is too much." John F. Manning, The
Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARv. L. REv. 2387,2442 (2003).
254. See Prakash, supra note 25, at 49 n.283.
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accordingly be more limited than positive lawmaking delegations of
equivalent scope. Likewise, waiver delegations (at least where not
expressly authorized by statute or where the criteria for granting
them cedes too much discretion to the Executive) should be limited
because of their functional similarity to the dispensation prerogative.
C. Article I, Section 7
Article I, Section 7 mandates bicameralism and presentment for
the enactment, repeal, and amendment of statutory text. Far from
mere empty formality, this carefully specified process has numerous
benefits. Presentment, coupled with the presidential veto, magnifies
these benefits. The upshot is that political minorities have significant
power to demand compromise as the cost of their assent to the
legislative goals of the majority. Statutory text embodies these
compromises. That text should not have its legal force or effect
undone through the exercise of unilateral executive discretion,
thereby allowing presidential policy to override the difficult policy
compromises reflected in statutory text. The mistake of Clinton was
not its focus on statutory text and the Article I, Section 7 lawmaking
process, but rather its overly wooden examination of textual form in
the abstract, and the troubling distinctions it attempted to draw to
differentiate the LIVA from other negative lawmaking delegations.
Before returning to Clinton's Article I, Section 7 test, this section
examines the benefits of bicameralism and presentment in greater
detail.
1. Purposes Served by Bicameralism and Presentment
The Article I, Section 7 lawmaking process serves a number of
related and somewhat overlapping purposes,255 all flowing from the
fact that bicameralism and presentment require Congress to incur
substantial costs in specifying statutory details.2 Article I, Section 7
increases the decision costs of legislating by "carefully divid[ing]
statutemaking power among three institutions-the House, the
Senate, and the President-which are elected at different times and
answer to different constituencies." 257 Three benefits stem from this
255. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Textualism As a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM.
L. REV. 673, 707-09 (1997).
256. Id. at 707 (noting how the bicarneralism and presentment "process increases the
decision costs of lawmaking").
257. Manning, supra note 35, at 1982.
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increase in decision costs. First, bicameralism and presentment
protects against the influence of self-interested factions. 5
Second, it promotes caution and deliberation because legislation
must go through an "intricate process involving distinct constitutional
actors, [thereby] reduc[ing] the incidence of hasty and ill-considered
legislation."29 And "by relying on multiple, potentially antagonistic
constitutional decisionmakers, the legislative process prescribed by
Article I often produces conflict and friction, enhancing the prospects
for a full and open discussion of matters of public import."260 As the
Court has explained:
The legislative steps outlined in Art. I are not
empty formalities; they were designed to assure that
both Houses of Congress and the President participate
in the exercise of lawmaking authority. This does not
mean that legislation must always be preceded by
debate .... But the steps required by Art. I, §§ 1, 7
make certain that there is an opportunity for
deliberation and debate. To allow Congress to evade
the strictures of the Constitution and in effect enact
Executive proposals into law by mere silence cannot
be squared with Art. I.261
258. See Manning, supra note 255, at 708 (describing how bicameralism and
presentment make it difficult for "factions to usurp legislative authority, ensuring a
diffusion of governmental power and preserving the liberty and security of the
governed."); 2 JOsEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 882, at 348 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, and Co. 1833) (noting how the presidential
veto power checks the power of Congress and helps "preserve the community against the
effects of faction, precipitancy, unconstitutional legislation, and temporary excitements, as
well as political hostility."); THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 407 (James Madison) (Belknap
Press of Harvard Univ. ed., 2009) (bicameralism "doubles the security to the people, by
requiring the concurrence of two distinct bodies in schemes of usurpation or perfidy,
where the ambition or corruption of one, would otherwise be sufficient.").
259. Manning, supra note 255, at 708-09.
260. Id. at 709.
261. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958 n.23 (1983). "Because Article II vests 'the
executive Power' in a constitutionally independent President who answers to a distinct
constituency, Congress must compete with a powerful and constitutionally independent
rival for control over the direction of administrative policy." Manning, supra note 255, at
712-13. Accordingly, "fuinless public policy reflects substantial interaction among the
branches, it is unlikely to reflect the quality of deliberation that the framers intended their
new representative government to exhibit." Peter M. Shane, Reflections in Three Mirrors:
Complexities of Representation in a Constitutional Democracy, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 693, 693
(1999).
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Bicameralism and presentment thus capture "the central
republican understanding that disagreement can be a creative
force,"" and thereby deliberately sacrifice lawmaking efficiency in
order to protect liberty.2 63
Third, bicameralism and presentment are immensely minority
protective, giving minorities tremendous ability to block legislative
change and promoting compromise in a lawmaking process that
would otherwise allow determined majorities to run roughshod over
minority dissenters.2"
The high cost of legislating means that, when the Executive
exercises its delegated authority to negate statutory text-whether by
waiving it for certain parties or governmental processes, by amending
it, or by cancelling it completely-the choices it makes "remain the
law unless and until Congress can overcome the substantial inertia of
the legislative process and pass a statute" to reverse the executive
negation If the negated text represents a legislative compromise
obtained by political minorities, those minorities must seek through
the Article I, Section 7 lawmaking process what they lost in the less
protective delegated lawmaking process. And, if the President
chooses to back the executive agent's exercise of delegated power
rather than acquiesce to Congress's attempt to override that choice
through legislation, Congress will presumably have to overcome a
presidential veto to reestablish the legal force or effect of the negated
statutory text.
Ensuring that negation of statutory text occurs through
bicameralism and presentment, rather than less cumbersome
delegated procedures, respects the specific procedural framework
outlined by the Constitution for amendment and repeal of statutes.2 66
262. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1562
(1988).
263. Manning, supra note 255, at 709; see also Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Emphasis
on the Presidency in U.S. Public Law: An Essay Critiquing Presidential Administration, 59
ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 6 (2007) ("Checks and balances are central to a deliberative democracy
in which the peoples' different viewpoints are shared and debated to arrive at outcomes
with broad appeal. No single preference is paramount, and no particular actor should be
dominant. The representation of diversity is a key attribute of a well-functioning system
of checks and balances.").
264. See infra notes 288-291 and accompanying text.
265. Manning, supra note 255, at 713-14.
266. See Manning, supra note 35, at 1952 (arguing that "when an enacted text
establishes a new power and specifies a detailed procedural framework for that power's
implementation, conventional principles of textual exegesis suggest that the resultant
specification should be treated as exclusive of any other alternative. (Why would
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That respect is warranted because "in the absence of any widely
shared baseline, every detail of the American separation of powers
had to be bargained for."267  Moreover, the choice of
constitutionmakers to involve two branches of the tripartite federal
government in the process of turning text, duly considered by both
Houses but devoid of legal force or effect, into law represents a
specific constitutional bargain.2 68 Indeed, "[tihe original U.S.
Constitution is . .. a 'bundle of compromises."" 69 Respecting those
compromises requires a proper understanding of Clinton's Article I,
Section 7 test given the purposes served by bicameralism and
presentment.
2. Recasting the Article I, Section 7 Test
The Court's Article I, Section 7 test is too mechanical,
formalistically examining statutory text in the abstract, rather than
whether the exercise of delegated lawmaking authority by the
Executive is negating, in whole or in part, a legislative bargain struck
pursuant to the meticulous constitutional structure. This myopic
focus is problematic because nothing close to literal alteration of the
"statutory text" occurs when the Executive exercises negative
lawmaking power.270 Because nobody can literally change the text of
duly enacted statutes (as if the President could somehow mark up the
master copy of the United States Statutes at Large), the more
relevant inquiry is whether the Executive is depriving statutory text of
legal force or effect without bicameralism and presentment.
One commentator points out that Clinton's wooden Article I,
Section 7 test, which seems to focus mechanically on textual form
over legal force or effect, would allow the same functional result as
constitutioninakers go to the trouble to spell out in exquisite detail the procedures for
enacting legislation ... if they viewed alternative procedures as equally acceptable?)").
267. Id. at 1978.
268. See id. at 1978-80.
269. Id. at 1978 & n.203 (quoting MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 201 (1913)).
270. See Prakash, supra note 25, at 39 (noting that the "official statutory text for most
statutes is found only in the United States Statutes at Large and not the U.S. Code" and
that the Statutes at Large "never changes, regardless of what happens after a bill becomes
law. In other words, its statutes appear just as Congress and the President enacted them
into law by Congress and the President.... [(L]egislative repeal or modification (which
will be printed in Statutes at Large) or the executive repeal or modification (which will
not) simply supersedes the prior statutory language found in United States Statutes at
Large.").
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the LIVA without the "supposed Presentment Clause infirmity."27'
Congress could allow executive negation of statutory text by
delegating regulatory authority to suspend the legal force or effect of
statutory text while leaving that text formally intact.2 72 Although such
a delegation might be an improper attempt to circumvent
bicameralism and presentment, such a critique applies to any
delegation, whether positive or negative.
While it is true that any lawmaking delegation could be viewed
as circumventing bicameralism and presentment, only negative
lawmaking delegations allow specific compromises in the negated
statutory text to be undermined-compromises likely integral to the
statute clearing the hurdles of bicameralism and presentment in the
first place. The real question, then, is the extent to which the
deprivation of legal force or effect from statutory text represents
infidelity to the legislative compromise embodied in that text. This is
so because the deprivation of legal force or effect may be complete or
nearly complete, as it was in Clinton, or it may be incomplete.
Amendment and cancellation delegations are complete
deprivations-one provides new text to take the cancelled text's
place, the other leaves nothing. Waiver and contingent legislation, by
contrast, are incomplete. Waiver is incomplete because it only
exempts certain entities, areas, or activities from the legal force or
effect of otherwise generally applicable statutory text, leaving the text
legally operative for those entities, areas, or activities not granted a
waiver.
This incomplete negative effect was demonstrated in Defenders
of Wildlife, where the text of the laws waived by the Secretary of
Homeland Security continued to have legal force or effect for
everything but the geographic area near and activities undertaken to
construct the border fence. Waivers may further be incomplete
where the negative effect has a temporal limitation, as do the state
innovation waivers Governor Romney promised to issue under the
ACA.
Contingent legislation's negative effect is also incomplete
because it acts as a statutory on/off switch,274 allowing statutory text to
take effect or be deprived of effect upon the Executive's
determination that specified contingencies have occurred. To the
271. Id. at 38.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 38 n.229.
274. See supra Part II.B.1.
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extent statutory text may once again have legal force or effect when
the Executive changes its determination, that text remains intact in
the United States Statutes at Large. This activation and deactivation
of statutory text took place under the Tariff Act analyzed in Field v.
Clark.275
Even if the President could cross out lines from a master copy of
the Statutes at Large, formal alteration of text alone is of no moment.
By focusing on merely the formal requirement of bicameralism and
presentment, Clinton overlooked the purposes that process serves,
thus leading the Court down a path that rigidly examines statutory
text and forcing the Court to draw unpersuasive distinctions from
lawmaking delegations with similar negative effect. But while
statutory text is important (because it represents the most precise and
best evidence of the legislative compromise struck),7 the idea that
text is somehow special in the abstract makes nonsense of the
lawmaking process. The fact that the legal force or effect of an
enacted text is altered outside the Article 1, Section 7 lawmaking
process is the true concern.
The constitutional text, for example, would be of no legal
significance had it not cleared the difficult procedural hurdles of
ratification. Accordingly, when legally operative text (whether
constitutional or statutory) is deprived of legal force or effect without
the same procedural hurdles that made the text legally operative, the
compromises embodied in that text are not implemented, and the
legislators involved are denied the fruits of their bargain.
Reconfiguring the Article I, Section 7 test in light of this insight
means reinvigorating bicameralism and presentment as a constraint
on negative lawmaking delegations. Doing so would help ensure that
legislators are not losing the benefit of their bargains in oblique or
indirect ways, or in ways in which they have no meaningful ability to
block or to force change.
275. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
276. See, e.g., W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98 (1991) ("The best
evidence of [statutory] purpose is the statutory text adopted by both Houses of Congress
and submitted to the President."); Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension
Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 374 (1986) ("Invocation of the 'plain purpose' of legislation at the
expense of the terms of the statute itself takes no account of the processes of
compromise."); Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory
Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61 (1994); John F. Manning, Textualism and
the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2001); Richard A. Posner, Legal
Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 179, 189 (1986) (contending that, as faithful subordinates of their
legislative superiors, judges must obey the text of statutes where it is clear).
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The Article I, Section 7 test of Clinton, properly understood,
represents fidelity to a highly specific constitutional bargain regarding
the procedure for lawmaking. Statutory text is important to
determining what the law is. Literal alteration or deletion of that text
would make the content of the law indeterminate. More important,
though, is that simply examining the statutory text does little to
illuminate the legislative compromises necessary to enact legally
meaningless text into law under Article I, Section 7. Negating or
altering the legal force or effect of that text outside of bicameralism
and presentment risks undermining whatever bargain was made for
that specific text, and it does so without the input of the parties who
made the bargain and without providing them any opportunity to
demand compromise in other areas in exchange for their agreement
to the change.
At the very least, then, Article I, Section 7 should preclude
negative lawmaking delegations that are not deeply rooted in history
and tradition. If Justice Scalia is correct about the relevant history
and tradition, then perhaps the title of the LIVA really did "fake out"
the Supreme Court.7 Likewise, negative delegations related to
embargoes, economic sanctions, or tariffs fall comfortably within the
tradition of allowing more play in the structural constitutional joints
for foreign affairs-related powers.278 Contingent legislation also has a
firmer place in the historical tradition.279 More generally, however,
negative lawmaking delegations are unconstitutional because they
allow precise legislative bargains struck through a painstaking
legislative process to be negated by the exercise of executive
discretion. That exercise of discretion avoids political accountability
and the procedural protections that govern lawmaking.
V. The Case for Limiting Negative Lawmaking Delegations
This Part contends that negative lawmaking delegations should
be limited in light of the purposes of the Article I, Section 7
277. Justice Scalia viewed the power delegated in the LIVA as functionally no
different than the power to impound funds or the power to spend funds under a lump-sum
appropriation, powers long exercised by the President and accordingly not powers "that
our history and traditions show must reside exclusively in the Legislative Branch."
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417,465-69 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Accordingly, for Justice Scalia, the discretion granted by the LIVA
was "no broader than the discretion traditionally granted to the President in his execution
of spending laws." Id. at 466.
278. See supra notes 150-151 and accompanying text.
279. See Lawson, supra note 30, at 363-68.
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lawmaking process. Lawmaking through this process is inherently
about compromise, and because the minority-protective features of
Article I, Section 7 engender compromise likely unobtainable
through less burdensome procedures, allowing executive negation of
statutory text undermines this protective function. With this
understanding, applying the Article I, Section 7 framework to some
examples of negative lawmaking delegations illustrates this pathology
of such delegations.
Although this Article argues that many negative lawmaking
delegations are unconstitutional, this Part offers some suggestions for
how Congress should fashion such delegations in the future,
recognizing that if such delegations are to be upheld as constitutional,
they should at least be more limited, both substantively and
procedurally, to approximate the benefits of bicameralism and
presentment.
A. Lawmaking as Compromise
Lawmaking inevitably reflects compromises. It is a process of
bargained-for exchange, the result of which represents the sum total
of those compromises, not necessarily a coherent blueprint for
achieving a particular statutory goal.2" As such, statutes inevitably
prescribe means for achieving a given end in a manner that a
reasonable person seeking to achieve that same end might not choose
alone.281 When the statute speaks in precise, rule-like terms, it
represents a policy choice made by a multimember deliberative body
that nevertheless speaks with a high degree of specificity. Such
specific choices should be honored. Indeed, statutory text that is
clear but seems inconsistent or imprecisely drafted might simply
reflect a compromise that was acceptable but not wholly satisfying to
the interest groups and political representatives involved in the
legislative battle, a compromise necessary to enact the statute.282 And
280. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 35, at 1978-79 (describing the lawmaking process
and noting that "[elven when lawmakers share a broad consensus about their basic goals,
they must still decide how broad a problem to tackle, whether to use rules or standards to
effectuate their aims, what remedial mechanisms to employ, and countless other
questions").
281. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 286 (1994) ("Statutes are seldom
crafted to pursue a single goal, and compromises necessary to their enactment may require
adopting means other than those that would most effectively pursue the main goal.").
282. As the Supreme Court has explained:
Dissatisfaction, however, is often the cost of legislative compromise.
And negotiations surrounding enactment of this bill tell a typical story
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because increasing a legal rule's specificity also increases the cost of
enacting it (both in terms of getting the necessary information about
the rule's impact and the necessary votes to adopt it"), the more
specific statutory text is, the less permissible it should be to negate
that text through a streamlined process such as unilateral executive
discretion.
Even less precise statutory text represents a compromise of sorts.
A statute seeking to further a given purpose might speak in the
abstract or at a high level of generality because the legislators
involved could only agree on the ends but not the means. High-level
policy ends (clean air or water, greater transparency and
accountability in the financial sector, a fair process for securing
disability benefits, and so on) are easier to agree on than the means
for achieving them.' Such imprecision, in the context of
administrative law, is treated as a delegation of interpretive authority
to an agency charged with administering the statute, thereby allowing
the agency to expound the details of a general statute that has
legislated a given policy goal."5 In some cases, the compromise
reflects the understanding that Congress is not best situated to make
of legislative battle among interest groups, Congress, and the
President. Indeed, this legislation failed to ease tensions among many
of the interested parties. Its delicate crafting reflected a compromise
amidst highly interested parties attempting to pull the provisions in
different directions. As such, a change in any individual provision
could have unraveled the whole.... The deals brokered during a
Committee markup, on the floor of the two Houses, during a joint
House and Senate Conference, or in negotiations with the President
are not for us to judge or second-guess.
Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438,461 (2002) (citations omitted).
283. See Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J.
65, 73 (1983) ("Rulemaking involves two sorts of social costs: the cost of obtaining and
analyzing information about the rule's probable impact, and the cost of securing
agreement among the participants in the rulemaking process. These costs usually rise with
increases in a rule's transparency since objective regulatory line-drawing increases the risk
of misspecification and sharpens the focus of value conflicts.").
284. See AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, THE SPIRIT OF COMPROMISE 17
(2012) (discussing how legislative compromise implicates principles as well as material
interests, and how comprehensive statutes like the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and the ACA
came about "because the principled positions that reformers espoused-a simple and
transparent tax code or universal healthcare coverage, for example---did not survive intact
in the tangled process that produced the final legislation").
285. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865
(1984) (describing reasons for textual ambiguity or generality and the implication for
deference to agency interpretations of the statutes they are charged with administering).
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the specific means choices-because of lack of time, will, expertise, or
the like. 6
Some commentators have argued that nondelegation doctrine
and bicameralism and presentment, when distilled, serve the same
purpose: ensuring that sufficiently important decisions are made, not
by less procedurally costly delegated lawmaking, but by the expensive
Article I, Section 7 lawmaking process 87 This argument lines up at
some level with the textualist justification for respecting the level of
generality at which statutory text speaks, which, at bottom, is about
accountability for a law's details (rather than its purpose alone) and
ensuring that political minorities have the power to impede the
legislative goals of the majority.m But what the argument fails to
account for fully is that compromise is inherent in the lawmaking
process, and respecting statutory text respects the compromises that
286. See Manning, supra note 35, at 1985-86 ("It is a common drafting strategy to
elide disagreement or deal with hard-to-predict futures by writing some provisions in
general terms-that is, to strike a bargain that, implicitly or explicitly, leaves much to be
decided by those charged with implementing the provisions in question.").
287. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 21, at 85-86 ("When the old pre-Roosevelt Court
struck down two delegations of power by Congress to the [E]xecutive, what the Court was
saying was that the actions those statutes delegated gave power to the [E]xecutive so
important that such action had to be done with bicameralism and presentment. Schechter
Poultry and Carter Coal were thus not only nondelegation doctrine cases, they were also,
in the words of Clinton v. City of New York, bicameralism and presentment cases.").
288. Manning, supra note 228, at 1314 (describing the political science foundation of
modern textualism, which "depends on the relatively modest empirical assumption that
when the text of a statute is clear but fits awkwardly with its purpose, its unusual shape
may reflect compromise rather than inadvertence"). The more important a policy goal
embodied in a given statute, the more important it is for political minorities to have a
meaningful voice in the lawmaking process. The Article 1, Section 7 lawmaking process
empowers political minorities by giving them the power to block legislative change; this
power, in turn, allows them to extract greater compromise from the majority than might
otherwise be possible. As Professor Manning explains:
Political scientists have shown, for example, that the bicameralism and
presentment requirements of Article I, Section 7 approximate a
supermajority requirement, thereby giving political minorities
extraordinary power to block legislative change. The legislative
procedures adopted by each House-most notably, committee
gatekeeping, the Senate filibuster, and the Senate's unanimous consent
requirement-accentuate that constitutional design feature.
Accordingly, by assuming that a clear text reflects the product of
compromise, second-generation textualism preserves the right of
minorities and outliers to insist that the majority take half a loaf, even
if the end result is not neatly logical, internally consistent, or tightly
connected to the background purposes that seemingly inspired the
majority to act.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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produced that text, even if that text may seem awkward, inefficient,
or fit imperfectly with the statute's stated purpose&9 Consequently,
preventing executive negation of statutory text respects the
compromises in the text that would have been negated.
B. Examples of Negative Lawmaking Delegations Allowing the
Unilateral Executive Override of Legislative Compromise
Executive negation of statutory text denies to legislatures the
specific bargains that were the products of hard-fought
compromises," just as interpreting statutes atextually "denies to
legislatures the choice of creating or withholding gap-filling
authority."'9  The broader and more unbounded the negative
lawmaking delegation, the greater the Executive's power to upset the
compromises embodied in specific statutory provisions. Because the
Executive represents a national, rather than a local or minority
constituency, such negation of compromises undermines the minority-
protective, compromise-inducing function of the cumbersome Article
I, Section 7 lawmaking process. The degree to which it does so, and
accordingly the constitutional concern, varies with the type of
negative lawmaking delegation at issue.
An internal waiver upsets legislative compromise only in those
provisions within the statute delegating the negative power. External
waivers, amendment delegations, and cancellation delegations allow
executive override of prior, current, and possibly even future
compromises. Contingent legislation, however, is of more limited
concern, because the power delegated merely allows the Executive to
determine when the negation will occur, usually conditioned on the
existence of objectively determinable criteria.
An important caveat regarding the interplay of the negative
lawmaking delegation framework with the independent lawmaking
powers of the Executive is in order. Although a full treatment of the
issues involved is outside this Article's scope, I do assume, consistent
289. See Manning, supra note 35, at 1978-79 (explaining that "compromise is
inevitable whenever lawmaking reflects 'the product of a multimember assembly,
comprising a large number of persons of quite radically differing aims, interests, and
backgrounds') (citing JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 125 (1999)).
290. See Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S.
361, 374 (1986) ("Congress may be unanimous in its intent to stamp out some vague social
or economic evil; however, because its Members may differ sharply on the means for
effectuating that intent, the final language of the legislation may reflect hard-fought
compromises.").
291. Frank H. Easterbrook, Statute's Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 533,547 (1983).
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with existing case law, that the Executive has some independent
lawmaking power. That power manifests itself in a variety of
contexts, a few examples of which are noted here. The political
question doctrine, for example, at times simply means a court has
decided the Constitution allows exclusive executive branch
lawmaking on the subject.' In the realm of foreign affairs,
presidential lawmaking has long been judicially sanctioned, though
the scope of the President's power in this realm has never been
defined precisely.'9 And in administrative law, Chevron deference
carries "special force"2 94 when a lawmaking delegation to the
Executive overlaps with the Executive's independent lawmaking
powers on the same subject,'" while the intelligible principle
requirement of nondelegation doctrine is relaxed in such
circumstances for analogous reasons.9 Accordingly, when an
executive agent overrides statutory compromises in pursuit of a
concrete goal, particularly when that goal is in a realm traditionally
considered within the independent constitutional authority of the
Executive, such negation of congressional compromises may be
acceptable. This is especially so when there is a long tradition of
allowing such delegations, or a long tradition of deference to the
Executive's views in a particular realm.2 9
Such tradition might be sufficient to defend the negative
lawmaking delegation in the REAL ID Act, as well as in the Tariff
292. Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 610-
12 (1976) (discussing how the Court's deeming a case to be a "political question" and thus
nonjusticiable could be considered a holding "that the President's decision was within his
authority and therefore law for the courts").
293. Henry Paul Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 47-56 (1993).
294. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1063 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J., dissenting)
(discussing the need for greater Chevron deference where "the subject of that analysis is a
delegation to the Executive of authority to make and implement decisions relating to the
conduct of foreign affairs").
295. See, e.g., Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 233 (1986);
CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 169-73 (1985); Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 232 (1984). For a
thorough discussion of the independent lawmaking powers of the Executive and the
interplay with judicial review of executive decisions, see generally Curtis Bradley, Chevron
Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 683 (2000).
296. See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 772 (1996).
297. See Michael P. Van Alstine, Stare Decisis and Foreign Affairs, 61 DUKE L.J. 941,
1009 (2012) (noting that "there is nothing unusual or particularly problematic about
judicial flexibility in a field of special executive authority" and that "in no field is executive
authority more pervasive than in foreign affairs").
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Act of 1890.298 Moreover, because the justification for independent
executive lawmaking power in part rests on relative institutional
competence (the President, as opposed to the multi-member
bicameral legislature, for example, is better positioned to direct
foreign affairs or the military), it makes pragmatic sense for Congress
to delegate flexibility to the constitutional actor in the best position to
make certain policy decisions.2" And contingent legislation, which
merely allows the Executive to determine a future condition or fact,
recognizes that Congress is not in a position to make such on-the-
ground determinations, at least not with the expediency that might be
necessary to ensure effective governance.
Consider, however, what such a position means when understood
in light of the minority-protective function of Article I, Section 7. For
example, for the REAL ID Act, when the Secretary waives other
laws to further the goal of constructing the border fence, each
negated portion of other statutory text is a statutory bargain being
overridden through a process less rigorous-and thus far easier-than
bicameralism and presentment. The groups represented in the
negated bargains have no meaningful way to participate in the
negative lawmaking process when it is done at the Secretary's "sole
discretion" merely through publication in the Federal Register, and
even if they had the ability to participate in the decisionmaking
process, they would lack the power to block lawmaking change and
thereby obtain compromise from the majority.
By delegating complete negative lawmaking discretion to the
Secretary, Congress avoided political accountability for waiving
important environmental statutes, among others. Because the
Secretary is insulated from the local constituents most affected by the
waivers, he is not as sensitive to the constituent-level needs that might
have greater salience to particular Members in the regions affected by
the waivers. Prior statutory bargains are thus negated without the
contentious deliberative process that might otherwise have caused
greater consideration of the appropriate policy balance to be struck
between expeditious construction of the border fence on one hand,
298. See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 683(1892).
299. See THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing the importance
of energy and vigor in the executive); Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 445
(1998) (noting the President has a better opportunity to observe the "conditions which
prevail in foreign countries"); Michael P. Van Alstine, Executive Aggrandizement in
Foreign Affairs Lawmaking, 54 UCLA L. REV. 309, 347 (2006) ("The unity of the national
executive represents an important institutional advantage in analyzing and responding to
the delicate issues that often attend international diplomacy.").
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and the important environmental and other interests protected by the
waived statutes on the other hand?.
Beyond ensuring political minorities the ability to block
legislation and thereby obtain compromises from the majority that
they would otherwise be unable to obtain,"o' the Article I, Section 7
lawmaking process, by horizontally blending the lawmaking function,
also protects small-state residents because each state has equal
representation in the Senate.302 When Secretary Chertoff exercised
his waiver authority under the REAL ID Act, he not only overrode
the compromises embodied in each of the federal laws he cancelled,
he also preempted all state and local laws that interfered with the
expeditious construction of the border fence. 03
Had the waiver authority not been granted, the Article I, Section
7 lawmaking process would have ensured that the residents most
affected by the waivers not only had a voice in whether federal laws
300. Fence construction angered many residents along the border, who saw the project
as both destructive to the commercial interests and natural resources of their local
communities, and likely to be ineffective in stemming the flow of illegal immigration. See
Dudley, supra note 88, at 851 n.6; Editorial, Haste Lays Waste: Ill-Planned Security
Fencing Along the Border Would Ravage the Communities It's Meant to Protect, HOUSTON
CHRON., Oct. 4, 2007, at B8. Indeed, Congressman Raul Grijalva, who represents
Arizona's 7th District, which is along the U.S.-Mexico border, introduced legislation
attempting to repeal the REAL ID Act waiver provision, but the bill died in committee.
See Borderlands Conservation and Security Act of 2007, H.R. 2593, 110th Cong. § 5(b)
(2007). Had the waiver itself been required to undergo the bicameral process,
Congressman Grijalva, who represents some of the people most directly affected by the
waivers and the project for which they were used, may have been able to block the waiver,
or at least to obtain compromise in other areas in exchange for his vote.
301. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 228, at 1314 (describing how bicameralism and
presentment, along with the legislative procedures of each House, "give political
minorities extraordinary power to block legislative change and insist on compromise as the
price of assent"); Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L.
REV. 109, 114-17 (2010) (discussing and agreeing with Professor Manning's argument that
allowing judges to alter statutory text risks undoing compromises that political minorities
may have extracted from the majority); Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Safeguards of
Federal Jurisdiction, 124 HARV. L. REV. 869, 881 (2011) (discussing how the structural
safeguards of the Article I lawmaking process give "even political minorities" the power to
block legislation); Glen Taszewski, The Bait-and-Switch in Direct Democracy, 2006 WIS. L.
REV. 17, 39 (2006) (stating that the traditional legislative process provides the safeguards
of bicameralism and presentment to protect political minorities).
302. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1; Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a
Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1371-72 (2001).
303. See supra note 154 and accompanying text. The federalism concerns of delegated
negative lawmaking authority are worthy of separate treatment; I note them here only to
demonstrate that bypassing the Article 1, Section 7 lawmaking process to negate other
laws circumvents important structural protections that ensure political minorities not only
have a voice in the process, but also the power to influence the outcome of the process.
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that protect them should yield to the goal of securing the border, but
also in whether their own local laws should yield. While the laws may
still have been waived, those political minorities most affected by the
waivers could have obtained compromise from the majority as the
price for their assent, perhaps in the form of concessions in other
legislation.
In Clinton, the compromises necessary to obtain minority votes
to pass the spending bills were overridden by the President's exercise
of the item veto power. Allowing this override to happen vitiates a
key purpose of Article I, Section 7 because the cancellation is done
outside the Article I, Section 7 bargaining process. In light of this
process, the President may veto the bundle of compromises
represented in the entire spending bill, but cannot pick and choose
which ones to negate; the President gets the whole loaf or nothing at
all.
Instead of vetoing entire bills, however, President Clinton
cancelled line items in two spending bills, and the City of New York
(which had won a longstanding battle over billions of federal dollars)
and the other affected group had to resort to the courts to protect
their interests, even though they already achieved legislative success
in Congress." Obtaining benefits in the spending bills may have been
the product of compromises in the spending bills themselves, or the
price of obtaining those groups' support for other legislation.
Allowing those compromises to be circumvented through unilateral
executive discretion undermines the minority-protective features of
the Article I, Section 7 lawmaking process, and it dishonors the
legislative bargain struck.
For the Vaccine Injury Table, the Federal Circuit thought it
important that the legislative history indicated Congress may have
chosen to codify the table in the statutory text rather than allow
agency promulgation of the Initial Table because of concerns over
agency delay.30' In so doing, however, Congress exposed the Table to
the compromise-promoting functions of the Article I, Section 7
lawmaking process. Each entry on the Table is therefore a legislative
bargain, one not necessarily made based on the technocratic
304. See supra text accompanying note 58.
305. See Terran ex rel. Terran v. Sec'y of Health & Human Services, 195 F.3d 1302,
1308 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citing Vaccine Injury Compensation: Hearings on H.R. 5810 Before
the Subcomm. on Health and the Env't of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
98th Cong. 210-11 (1984) (letter from Martin H. Smith, Vice President, American
Academy of Pediatrics to Representative Henry A. Waxman)).
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judgment of Congress that the best available medical science had
identified a given injury as linked to a given vaccine, but made instead
as the price for some legislator's vote. For the injured child, the
congressionally enacted table would have compensated her, but the
agency table did not. And for the dolphins in Hogarth, the agency
rule meant one additional hour of exposure to a dangerous method of
tuna fishing, while under the congressionally enacted statute they
were better protected.
The unraveling of the near-entirety of a comprehensive statute
by waiver is also problematic. Governor Romney's promise to issue
state innovation waivers under the ACA was, in effect, a promise to
partially repeal the ACA. Doing so would undermine the many
specific compromises necessary to specify each detail of the
comprehensive health insurance coverage scheme the Act prescribes,
compromises born when legislators sacrificed principled positions in
order to reach agreement.O So too would allowing Health and
Human Services to rewrite the statutory framework governing
Medicare, as several sections of the ACA appear to allow it to do.0
Given the cost of reaching the specific compromises required to
enact text of such painstaking detail, effective repeal of that text
should not be delegable.08 Nor should the power to negate specific
statutory compromises be granted with open-ended, vacuous criteria,
as it was in the LIVA. Even where Congress expressly delegates
negative lawmaking power to the Executive and delineates
procedural and substantive criteria to constrain the exercise of
discretion by the Executive, such a delegation abdicates the
legislature's constitutional role. Preventing such abdication preserves
the constitutional structure and ensures that when a legislative
bargain is to be undone, whether temporarily or permanently, it will
more often require another legislative bargain, instead of unilateral
discretion by an agent such as the President."
306. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 281.
307. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
308. See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
309. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 452 (1998) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) ("Abdication of responsibility is not part of the constitutional design."); Jack
M. Beermann, An Inductive Understanding of Separation of Powers, 63 ADMIN. L. REV.
467, 480 (2011) ("Once the President signs a bill, each and every provision it contains
becomes law, and there is nothing the President can do unilaterally to alter its legal effect.
All the practical arguments about the necessity for an effective method of deficit reduction
and the degree of discretion Presidents traditionally have over the actual spending of
appropriated funds were not relevant to the basic structural reality.").
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It is true that the inclusion of a negative lawmaking delegation in
a comprehensive statute, such as the waiver delegation within the text
of the ACA, might itself be the result of legislative compromise;
perhaps some legislators were more willing to sign on to the ACA
knowing their states might later be exempted from the specifics of the
Act's health insurance requirements. That does not change the fact
that an ACA waiver allows executive negation of the text specifying
the details of health insurance requirements for each state; this formal
negative effect on statutory text alone raises concerns under Clinton's
formulation of Article I, Section 7.
Formal negative effect is not the only pathology of the ACA
waiver delegation, however. For if the specific health insurance
requirements embodied in the ACA's text may be overridden by
general executive discretion, then so too may Congress allow
executive discretion to override the specifics of other comprehensive
statutory schemes. Congress thus not only gets to make specific
policy choices, but also gets to avoid the consequences of those policy
choices by delegating the power to change them to an executive actor.
Such a result abdicates congressional responsibility for the policy
consequences of its legislative bargains. Once the legislature has
gone through the trouble of framing legal rules with specificity, a
costly process given that it requires agreement among a diverse set of
representative actors,"o it should also shoulder responsibility for
making sure the rules it specified are the rules it wishes to keep. And
because waivers generally occur in the discretion of an executive
agent below the President-for example, the Secretary of Homeland
Security or the Secretary of Health and Human Services-the
executive agent with discretion to negate is less representative than
the legislators whose statutory details are being negated.
C. The Impact on the Administrative State and Some Practical
Considerations
Requiring bicameralism and presentment before negation of
statutory text would make law more permanent, and less malleable in
response to changing circumstances. The separation of powers, after
all, was designed to "impose burdens on governmental processes that
310. See Diver, supra note 280.
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often seem clumsy, inefficient, even unworkable.""' This inefficiency
was a deliberate choice meant to protect liberty by diffusing power.31
Because making law through bicameralism and presentment is
hard, Article I, Section 7, at its core, embodies an ideal, a republican
commitment to the preservation of liberty. If there are to be laws
that govern us, those laws should not be easily passed; if we are to be
burdened by such laws, their content should be determined by our
representatives; and if we are to allow our representatives to make
such determinations, those determinations should be carefully
made."' Accordingly, some might argue that delegating negative
lawmaking power may serve, rather than hinder, this ideal, for if the
Executive is not creating laws but negating them, there will be fewer
laws restricting our freedom. This may be so in some cases-
Governor Romney's promised healthcare waivers, for example,
would have relieved a burden on the states and thus their citizens-
but in other cases negative lawmaking delegations allow the
Executive to negate laws designed to protect us. When Secretary
Chertoff unilaterally waived dozens of laws to expedite construction
of the border fence, he negated those laws not to remove a burden on
individual liberty, but to remove a burden on the exercise of
governmental power, laws such as the Clean Water Act, the Safe
Drinking Water Act, the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act, and the Administrative Procedure
Act. 14 From this perspective, negative lawmaking delegations only
sometimes allow the Executive to limit the extent to which laws
restrict individual liberty.
Some commentators also argue that stricter enforcement of
bicameralism and presentment, though it might limit the extent to
which Congress delegates negative lawmaking power, would also
encourage Congress to forgo specificity in its statutes and to instead
311. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).
312. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721 (1986) ("The declared purpose of separating
and dividing the powers of government, of course, was to 'diffus[e] power the better to
secure liberty."') (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
313. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 247, at 101-06 (discussing how the
Constitution's diffusion of power, and its system of checks and balances, were designed to
protect liberty, in large part by increasing political accountability and by limiting the
power of factions).
314. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
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rely on broader, more open-ended positive delegations.' Under the
weak nondelegation doctrine, broader positive delegations would
allow agencies to make rules with legal force or effect and also to
cancel those rules with less than bicameralism and presentment. This,
in turn, would achieve the same effect that legislating with specificity
but delegating negative lawmaking power currently achieves.
While this argument has merit, it represents a general critique of
the state of nondelegation doctrine and the rise of the administrative
state, not an attack on the Article I, Section 7 lawmaking process or
the purposes that it serves. Administrative lawmaking generally
requires significant process under the APA and is subject to judicial
review, allowing a greater policymaking role for both the Executive
and the Judiciary vis-A-vis Congress, perhaps more than is
constitutionally appropriate.' Reinvigorating bicameralism and
presentment, while no panacea for the problem of broad lawmaking
delegations generally, nevertheless would encourage Congress to be
more accountable for the legislation it enacts, and the policy choices it
is required to make.' If a statute is bad policy, politically unpopular,
or unworkable in practice, Congress should repeal or fix it, consistent
with Article I, Section 7.V" Congress should not rely on the Executive
315. See, e.g., Prakash, supra note 25, at 18-25 (arguing that having greater statutory
specificity and then allowing negative lawmaking delegations is both functionally
equivalent to and better as a policy matter than broad, open-ended positive lawmaking
delegations).
316. See Garry, supra note 80, at 693 (arguing that the rise of the administrative state
has not only granted the Judiciary a greater policymaking role than the Framers originally
intended, but also has increased the power of the Judiciary relative to the representative
Branches).
317. The ability to avoid accountability for difficult, and potentially unpopular, policy
choices tempts Congress to achieve its goals through less transparent, and thus less
accountable, means. For example, Congress chose to delegate to the President the power
to change the debt ceiling specified by statute in 31 U.S.C. § 3101(b), doing so in large part
to "force the President to bear accountability for the unpopular task historically within the
province of congressional responsibility." Constitutional Law-Separation of Powers-
Congress Delegates Power to Raise the Debt Ceiling-Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L.
No. 112-25, 125 Stat. 240 (to Be Codified in Scattered Sections of the U.S. Code), 125
HARV. L. REv. 867, 869 (2012).
318. Forcing Congress to make, rather than avoid, the difficult policy choices involved
in lawmaking has led one commentator to argue that Article I, Section 7 also requires both
houses of Congress to agree on identical text and allows judicial review of the
congressional lawmaking process to ensure that Congress so agreed. Congress cannot
delegate the choice between two textually different bills to actors outside bicameralism
and presentment. Courts, however, remain generally unwilling to examine alleged flaws in
the legislative process for enacting a statute. See Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, Legislative
Supremacy in the United States?: Rethinking the "Enrolled Bill" Doctrine, 97 GEO. L.J. 323,
363-64 (2009).
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to do the fixing, thereby avoiding its constitutional obligation and
forgoing political accountability. 9 Nor should the Executive be able
to override compromise forged in the crucible of the bicameral
process.
This result was a deliberate choice by the Framers, who carefully
divided lawmaking power between two branches while also crafting a
highly specific lawmaking process, suggesting a desire not only to
separate while simultaneously blending powers,320 but also to protect
the political minorities who might otherwise be overlooked in a less
costly process.32 The specificity with which this choice was enshrined
in the constitutional text suggests that this procedure should not
lightly be departed from. As the Court has noted:
By allocating specific powers and responsibilities
to a branch fitted to the task, the Framers created a
National Government that is both effective and
accountable. Article I's precise rules of
representation, member qualifications, bicameralism,
and voting procedure make Congress the branch most
capable of responsive and deliberative lawmaking. Ill
suited to that task are the Presidency, designed for the
prompt and faithful execution of the laws and its own
legitimate powers, and the Judiciary, a branch with
tenure and authority independent of direct electoral
control. The clear assignment of power to a branch,
furthermore, allows the citizen to know who may be
called to answer for making, or not making, those
319. Though the Executive is representative, and thus politically accountable to a
certain extent, it is "situated in the constitutional scheme quite differently" than Congress.
Marci A. Hamilton, Representation and Nondelegation: Back to Basics, 20 CARDOZO L.
REV. 807, 808 (1999). Understanding the different representative roles that the two
branches serve undercuts any argument that it is sufficient that an executive agent,
supervised by the elected President, is sufficiently representative to make his decisions
accountable to the people.
320. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 318 (James Madison) (Belknap Press of Harvard
Univ. ed., 2009) (discussing how the separation of powers did not mean that the branches
"ought to have no partial agency in, or no control over the acts of each other"); THE
FEDERALIST No. 48, at 324, 325 (James Madison) (Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. ed.,
2009) (explaining why the branches needed to be "connected and blended as to give to
each a constitutional control over the others" to check the "encroaching nature" of power
through more than mere "parchment barriers"); M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation
in Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127, 1155-82 (2000) (discussing the
competing traditions of separation and balance of powers underlying the Constitution).
321. See supra notes 288-291 and accompanying text.
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delicate and necessary decisions essential to
governance ... [Tihe delegation doctrine ...
prevent[s] Congress from forsaking its duties.322
If all this is so, then many lawmaking delegations in the
administrative state, whether positive or negative, may well be
unconstitutional. That conclusion might represent the most faithful
adherence to not only the text and structure of the Constitution, but
its historical backdrop, and the purposes served by its structural
protections.3 23  Nevertheless, because such a result is not only
inconsistent with current doctrine but also unworkable, given the
practical difficulties in upsetting an administrative state so reliant on
lawmaking delegations generally, this section offers some thoughts on
how the benefits of bicameralism and presentment might be
approximated through delegated lawmaking procedures, focusing
especially on negative lawmaking delegations.
First, negative lawmaking delegations should provide express,
specific criteria as requirements for the executive negation of the
legal force or effect of statutory text. Doing so would make negative
lawmaking delegations mirror the contingent legislation category, one
better situated in history and tradition. Because drafting in
generalities is a common tool to resolve legislative disagreement,
requiring specificity would ensure that negative lawmaking
delegations were more often the products of legislative compromise
themselves, rather than open-ended tools, phrased in general terms,
that grant the Executive the discretion to undermine legislative
compromise elsewhere. By specifically identifying both the criteria
for executive negation of statutory text and which statutory text is
subject to the negative power, Congress can help ensure that
legislators, rather than executive agents, have chosen which legislative
bargains should yield to the policy goal underlying the negative
lawmaking delegation.324 The LIVA did not have such protections:
322. Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757-58 (1996).
323. For an extended argument that excessive delegation is both inconsistent with the
Constitution properly interpreted and bad public policy, see generally DAVID
SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How CONGRESS ABUSES THE
PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993).
324. Ensuring that legislators make these policy choices, difficult though the choices
may be, is an important constitutional principle. As Justice Scalia has pointed out: "It is
difficult to imagine a principle more essential to democratic government than that upon
which the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation is founded: Except in a few areas
constitutionally committed to the Executive Branch, the basic policy decisions governing
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although it putatively constrained Executive discretion with three
requirements before cancellation, it in reality granted the President
great room to maneuver, essentially delegating the difficult policy
choice of which specific spending provisions (likely the products of
legislative compromises themselves) should yield to the more general
policy goal of a balanced budget.
Second, predicating executive exercise of delegated negative
lawmaking power upon express, specific criteria suggests that judicial
review of the exercise of delegated lawmaking authority is critical. 25
Allowing executive negation of any statutory text in the Secretary of
Homeland Security's "sole discretion," while also limiting review of
that exercise of discretion to claims of constitutional violation, makes
the Executive's interpretation of its delegating statute unreviewable.
It renders the requirements for waiving other laws toothless.
Third, coupled with judicial review to give their views the power
to block change, political minorities should be given a voice in any
delegated negative lawmaking procedure. Because the Executive
represents a national, rather than a local, constituency, majoritarian
impulses might override the local interests that would otherwise have
been protected had the same result been sought through
326bicameralism and presentment. Ensuring that each affected group
plays a role in the lawmaking process decreases the risk that any one
group will gain undue control of a lawmaking process deliberately
designed to be cumbersome and at times fractious and incoherent.
Judicial review to ensure the executive agent took the minority views
into account would grant a rough approximation of the power to
demand compromise in the bicameral legislative process. While not
equivalent by any means, it would ensure that political minorities not
only had a voice in the decision to negate laws affecting them, but
that their voice was heard in a meaningful way.327
society are to be made by the Legislature." Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415
(1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also David Schoenbrod, Politics and the Principle That
Elected Legislators Should Make the Laws, 26 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 239, 251-53
(2003).
325. See Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Presumption of Reviewability: A Study of
Canonical Construction and Its Consequences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 743, 752-65 (1992)
(discussing how the Court and commentators have both thought judicial review of agency
decisions critical to the legitimacy of administrative lawmaking).
326. See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
327. There are a variety of ways in which the courts have imposed procedural
requirements on agency lawmaking that attempt to "replicat[e] the process of interest
group representation and bargaining thought responsible for legislation." See Elena
Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2264-72 (2001) (discussing
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The three suggestions here are familiar, for they reflect well-
established requirements of administrative rulemaking. 2 In short,
negative lawmaking delegations, if Congress is to continue to make
them, should mirror the procedures required for positive lawmaking
delegations. Such procedures, however, should be stricter for
negative lawmaking delegations, because of the unique structural
concerns such delegations raise. And because the procedures
associated with administrative rulemaking reflect constitutional
values associated with the Constitution's structural protections,32 to
require that negative lawmaking delegations have those procedures
ensures that such delegations better honor the Constitution's
republican design."'o These procedures make negative lawmaking
delegations more accountable, and thus more legitimate; they help
ensure that decisions regarding whether laws are to yield to some
other policy goal will not be made arbitrarily;33' they allow Congress
and the people it represents to better superintend agency action (or
interest group representation in administrative rulemaking and how judicial review
attempts to facilitate political control over that process). The relative merits and demerits
of such procedures in the broader context of administrative lawmaking is beyond this
Article's scope. At a minimum, however, some form of interest group representation, and
a way to ensure that such interest groups have a role in the negative lawmaking process,
seems critical given the risk that negative lawmaking delegations allow unilateral
executive override of legislative compromise that political minorities have obtained in
Congress. See supra Part V.A-B.
328. See Kagan, supra note 327, at 2253-72 (discussing the history and theory of
"mechanisms of administrative control").
329. Gillian Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law,
110 COLUM. L. REV. 479, 484 (2010) (noting the accountability concerns reflected in the
Administrative Procedure Act); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public
Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985) (discussing similarities between the constitutional
structure and administrative procedure).
330. See Evan J. Criddle, When Delegation Begets Domination: Due Process of
Administrative Lawmaking, 46 GA. L. REV. 117, 124 (2011) ("[Wlhere Congress delegates
lawmaking authority to the other branches, it must channel that authority through liberty-
promoting procedures that are functionally comparable to the checks and balances of
Articles I and II. Congress may satisfy this standard by prescribing an intelligible principle
to guide agency discretion, coupled with APA-style deliberative administrative procedures
that are backed by political accountability and judicial review.").
331. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy
in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 516-27 (2003) (discussing the
importance of procedure in preventing arbitrary lawmaking and contending that it is a
concern for preventing arbitrariness, rather than for preserving accountability, that is most
reflected in the Court's administrative law jurisprudence, including Chadha and Clinton).
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inaction); and they allow the people to better understand agency
decisionmaking.3 32
Conclusion
The rise of the modern administrative state, facilitated by
delegation to the Executive of Congress's lawmaking function, stands
in stark contrast to nondelegation doctrine's status as a bedrock
principle of American constitutional law since the founding of the
Republic. That nondelegation doctrine has proven unworkable as a
limitation on executive lawmaking, however, does not mean that all
executive lawmaking is constitutional. By focusing on the effect
delegated lawmaking power has on statutory text, this Article has
shown that two distinct types of lawmaking delegations, positive and
negative, exist in the modern administrative state.
Within this dichotomy, negative lawmaking delegations, which
allow the discretionary executive negation of statutory text, are more
problematic in light of the constitutional text and structure. This
Article has shown that, in today's administrative state, four distinct
types of negative lawmaking delegations predominate: contingent
legislation, amendment, waiver, and cancellation. Although each
type of negative lawmaking delegation formally allows the negation
of statutory text-thus raising concerns under the Court's holding
that alteration of statutory text requires bicameralism and
presentment-amendment, waiver, and cancellation delegations are
more problematic because they undermine the minority-protective,
compromise-inducing functions of Article I, Section 7. Cancellation
also resembles suspension, while waiver resembles dispensation; this
functional similarity to long-rejected royal prerogatives, denied to the
President by the Take Care Clause, also raises separation of powers
concerns.
Nevertheless, this Article has also shown that lower courts have
yet to invoke Clinton v. City of New York to strike down a negative
lawmaking delegation. Rather than continue to mechanically apply
the verbal formulation of Clinton's Article I, Section 7 test, courts
should focus on following its core principle, thereby limiting the use
of delegated negative lawmaking power. Ensuring that statutory text,
once enacted, is negated through the same process that created it
would further key structural purposes served by the Article I, Section
332. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures As Politics in Administrative Law, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1752, 1776-804 (2007) (explaining how administrative law,
including its procedural rules, helps further representative political values).
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7 lawmaking process, and in so doing would protect the compromises
inherent in, and the minorities represented by, the details of statutory
text.
